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INTRODUCTION

Police brutality, corruption and abuse of authority have long presented
American cities with some of their most pressing-and legally vexing-social
problems. In 1931, President Herbert Hoover' s Wickersham Commission
found extensive evidence of police misconduct and violence throughout major
urban departments. 1 In the 1960s, widespread police brutality sparked a series
of urban riots, leading the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to declare that
"police brutality in the United States ... is a serious and continuing problem."2
In 1980, the city of Miami erupted in violent riots after a jury acquitted four
police officers in the beating death of a black man.3 Again, the Commission
on Civil Rights declared that "violations of the civil rights of our people by
some members of police departments is a serious national problem."4
In 1991 , the issue of police brutality explotled onto the nation's
consciousness-and into the streets of Los Angeles-with the home video
depicting the vicious beating of Rodney King by four police officers. 5 More
recently, the torture of Haitian-American Abner Louima by New York City
police officers, 6 and questions surrounding the shooting (or rather, the mowing

' See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LA w ENFORCEMENT 153-56 ( 1931) [hereinafter WICKERSHAM REPORT].
2

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS
REPORT, BOOK v: JUSTICE 26 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 U.S. COMM ' N ON CIVIL RIGHTS
REPORT].
3
See John Crewdson, Fourteen Die in Miami Riot, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1980, at Al
(describing the number of casualties and extent of the damage in Miami on the second day
of the riot).

4

Letter from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to President James Carter (July
1980), POLICE PRACTICES AND THE PRESERVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: A STATEMENT BY THE
UNITED STA TES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS ii-iii ( 1980) [hereinafter POLICE PRACTICES].
5
See, e.g., Martin Berg, Chronology of the Case, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Feb. 3, 1992, at
8. After the four officers were acquitted of state law charges arising from the incident, three
days of riots ensued in which fifty-eight people were killed and 2283 injured. See Louis
Sahagun & Carla Rivera, Jittery L.A. Sees Rays of Hope, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at Al
(describing the first clean-up and reconstruction efforts after " a horrific three-day
nightmare"); Toll from the Riot, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 1992, at 9A (listing the casualties,
arrests, and property destruction from the riot). See also infra notes 186, 257 and
accompanying text (mentioning the Rodney King beating).
6 Arrested after trying to break up a bar-fight, Louima was beaten by police en route to
the station and taken into a station house bathroom, where officers shoved the wooden
handle of toilet plunger into his rectum and mouth, causing severe damage, which required
months of surgery and hospitalization. Four officers and a sergeant were indicted on federal
charges ranging from sexual assault to conspiracy. See Dan Barry, Little Help from Officers
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down) of Amadou Diallo,7 have heightened the public perception that police
brutality and misconduct are escalating. 8
Criminal prosecutions and administrative disciplinary proceedings against
offending officers have proven largely ineffective in curbing pervasive police
misconduct over the years. 9 It is not hard to see why: the refusal of officers to
report or corroborate the misconduct of their brethren, 10 the reluctance of
prosecutors to indict the officers upon whom they depend, 11 and the
extraordinary protections afforded police officers under collective bargaining
agreements and local laws, 12 all conspire to ensure the inefficacy of these
approaches to the problems of police misconduct and brutality.

in Torture Case Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1997, at A22. Officer Justin Volpe pied
guilty in May 1999 to civil rights charges and awaits sentencing. The other officers
allegedly involved in the incident were acquitted of beating Louima and currently face
charges of trying to cover up the torture of the Haitian immigrant. See Tara George,
Prosecutors: Give Volpe Life, DAILY NEWS, Nov. 23, 1999. See also infra note 209 and
accompanying text.
7 Four NYPD officers shot and killed Diallo, an unarmed 22-year old immigrant from
Guinea, on February 4, 1999 outside his Bronx apartment building. The officers, who
claimed they thought Diallo had a gun, fired 41 shots and hit him 19 times. See Rocco
Parascandola, Rudy Tells Rookies: Don't Forget Respect, N.Y. POST, Feb. 19, 1999.
8
See, e. g., Beating the Cops: Brutality Claims Denude City Coffers of $98 Million,
VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 23, 1997, at 35, 38 (reporting that in 1997, 2735 civil misconduct and
brutality claims were filed against New York City police, up from 1567 in 1993 ).
9
See Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-Searches and Seizures-Warranted Search of
Party Not Suspected of Criminal Behavior is Unreasonable When Subpoena Not Shown to
be Impractical, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1317, 1327 (1973) ("Available remedies for such police
misconduct-federal 'tort' actions, criminal prosecutions, injunctions, and internal police
disciplinary measures-are generally thought to be ineffective.").
IO The infamous police code of silence is discussed at great length in Part V. See infra
notes 202-48 and accompanying text.
11
See, e.g., David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 465, 499 (1992) ("[P]rosecutors do not like prosecuting fellow law
enforcement officers with whom they work on a day-to-day basis; evidence of such
misconduct is often shielded by the code of silence; victims are more readily subject to
impeachment .. . ; and juries are inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to the police.").
12
The so-called "Police Bill of Rights," in effect in many cities, severely limits the
ability of police administrators to suspend or dismiss an officer, even in cases where the
officer is convicted of a felony. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE:
POLICE BRUTALITY & ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 71 , n.135 (1998) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT]. In many cities, even when officers are suspended for
misconduct, they continue to receive salaries and other benefits. See id. at 71 , n.135. In
New York City, for example, an officer accused of misconduct is not required to speak to
internal affairs investigators for 48 hours following the incident. See, e.g., Tracey Tully &
Alice McQuillan, Congress Probe of NYPD Brutality Urged, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, March 2,
1999 (discussing the "so-called 48-hour rule, which allows cops to remain silent for two
days after an incident" of alleged brutality or misconduct).
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The primary vehicle afforded private citizens for addressing constitutional
deprivations by local law enforcement, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has likewise failed to
live up to its promise of eradicating widespread and pernicious practices of
rank and file officers. 13 The goal of this Article is to examine the inadequacies
of current civil rights jurisprudence and to suggest that, by revisiting the
original l~nguage and aspirations of § 1983, we can discern a theory of civil
rights liability that meaningfully addresses the forces animating much of
contemporary police misconduct.
Section 1983, originally enacted as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, was
intended to combat the widespread practices of local officials, including rankand-file municipal officers, that impeded implementation of the principles
enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 In passing the statute, the 42nd
Congress understood that, while state and local legislatures were swiftly
passing laws throughout the South to conform to the mandates of the
Reconstruction amendments, unwritten codes guiding the conduct of local
officials in southern strongholds undermined the new constitutional and
statutory edicts. 15
The architects of the original Ku Klux Klan Act used the term "custom" to
refer to the nefarious unwritten codes of conduct pursuant to which local
officials terrorized freedmen and Republicans, and failed to enforce
Reconstruction era laws against dissenters. 16 The proscriptive provisions of the
13
Commentators have long noted the ineffectiveness of civil rights laws in addressing
police brutality and misconduct. See, e.g., Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse:
Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753,
753-54 ( 1993) (stating that § 1983 is ineffective because actions under that section are
prohibitively expensive to poor minorities, plaintiffs have only limited ability to enjoin
dangerous police techniques, and juries tend to find police officers more credible than
plaintiffs); David S. Cohen, Official Oppression: A Historical Analysis of Low-Level Police
Abuse and a Modern Attempt at Reform, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 165, 182 (1996)
(finding it "obvious that § 1983 does not reach the low-level police uses of force that
permeate the history" of policing).
14
Civil Rights Act of 1871 , Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1996)); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-75 (1961) ("It was ...
the failure of certain states to enforce the laws with an equal hand that furnished the
powerful momentum behind" the statute); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1154 (1977) ("[T]he Act was aimed at least as much at
the abdication of law enforcement responsibilities by Southern officials as it was at the
Klan's outrages."). See also infra notes 140-83 and accompanying text (describing the
history of federal Civil Rights legislation).
15
See Monroe , 365 U.S. at 180 ("[B]y reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance,
or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of
rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied
by the state agencies."); see also infra notes 157-74 and accompanying text (discussing the
state of affairs that prompted the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act).
16
See Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 213, 229
(1979) ("The unconstitutional customs with which supporters of section 1983 were
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Act, which survive verbatim today in the text of § 1983, provide federal
remedies for the unconstitutional actions of local officials acting under color of
"any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State." 17
While the particular "customs" that prevailed amongst deputy sheriffs, local
prosecutors and Klansmen in the postbellum South have largely subsided,
other "customs," in the form of unwritten codes of conduct among modem law
enforcement officials regularly impair rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment today. Indeed, I will argue that institutionalized, unwritten
"customs"-within the original meaning of the statute-underlie many, if not
most, of the constitutional deprivations suffered at the hands of contemporary
police officers.
A primary focus of this Article is the failure of current § 1983 municipal
liability jurisprudence to address these unconstitutional "customs." 18
Beginning with its 1978 decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services of
the City of New York, 19 the Supreme Court has delineated the scope of certain
types of unlawful official "policies" that may give rise to municipal liability
under § 1983.20 As a result, a generation of lawyers and judges has struggled
to fit particular cases within the pigeonholes carved out by the handful of
municipal "policy" cases the Court has fortuitously chosen to decide. But the
truly animating forces of modem day police misconduct are not to be found in
the "policy pigeonholes" recognized by the Court. Rather, these forces are
functions of "custom," as understood by the framers of the original Ku Klux
Klan Act: pervasive unwritten codes of conduct followed by rank and file
officers that regularly abridge the constitutional rights of the citizenry.
The concern here lies not merely with the proper classification of municipal
liability claims . brought under the statute. Rather, I will argue that by
concentrating on a "policy" requirement for imposing municipal liability, the
Court has turned a blind eye toward the one feature of the statute that captures
the realities of modem law enforcement practices. "Custom" claims for
municipal liability, I contend, have the potential to address a wide spectrum of
concerned were [not] ... exercises of final or delegated authorities, but the widespread and
persistent practices of ordinary sheriffs, judges and prosecutors."); see generally J.
RANDALL & D. DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 682-84 (2d ed. 1961 ); see
also infra notes 175-86 and accompanying text (discussing the roots of "custom" in the
statute).
17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1996).
18
As a threshold matter, I take it as true that municipal liability for police misconduct is
necessary for addressing unconstitutional "customs" because individual liability against
offending officers has little practical effect. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text
(discussing the prevalence of state and local indemnification statutes and the problems of
incentives, individual liability, and accountability).
19
436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also infra notes 28-32, 59-61 and accompanying text
(detailing the facts of the case and the Supreme Court's analysis).
20 See infra Part III (divining three models of "policy" from the Court's post-Monell §
1983 jurisprudence).
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recurring unconstitutional conduct on the part of low-level officials that simply
go unaddressed by current law.
On one level, a proper understanding of a cause of action for an unlawful
"custom" under § 1983 will enable entire categories of plaintiffs to seek
meaningful compensatory relief that would otherwise be unavailable. Of at
least equal significance, judicial determinations that locate municipal fault
within a "custom" maintained by rank and file officers may induce local
governments to focus attention and resources upon the very cultures and
practices that drive constitutional violations in modem law enforcement
organizations, thus reducing future violations on an institutional scale. 21
In Part I of this article, I will review the evolution of the doctrine of
municipal liability under § 1983 and consider some of the underlying
rationales for imposing liability on local government entities for the
constitutional violations of individual officials. In Part II, I will survey the
current landscape of § 1983 jurisprudence, with particular focus on the various
species of municipal "policy" that the Court has created or recognized as bases
for the imposition of municipal liability. I will show that the municipal
liability theories currently endorsed by the Court fail to address the most
pervasive and serious unconstitutional practices among rank and file law
enforcement officials.
In Part III, I will discuss the largely forgotten "custom" basis for
establishing municipal liability under § 1983. Drawing on the legislative and
social history surrounding the statute, I will critique the sparse treatment of
"custom" by the federal courts from 1871 to the present, and lay the
groundwork for a theory of "custom" that meaningfully addresses
unconstitutional practices in contemporary policing.
In Part IV, I will focus on a particularly pernicious custom, the "police code
of silence," as a means of illustrating how § 1983 's "custom" prong can
address pervasive unconstitutional police practices. In this connection, I will
point out how the code of silence causes-in both the colloquial and tort law
senses of causation-constitutional deprivations on an everyday basis. By
reviewing some familiar and recurring fact patterns, I will show how the code
of silence, in its various forms, is a necessary predicate for most incidents of
police brutality, corruption and misconduct.
In Part V, I will outline the contours of a claim that squarely challenges the
maintenance of the police code of silence as an unlawful custom within the
meaning of § 1983. In doing so, I will demonstrate the power of "custom"
2
1. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,651 (1980) ("Section 1983 was
intended not only to provide compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a
deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as well."); see also Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978) (observing that the policies underlying § 1983
include preventing abuses of power); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978)
("Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of constitutional
rights ...."); see also infra notes 321-31 and accompanying text (discussing the possible
deterrence effects of§ 1983 "custom" claims).
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claims to address a broad array of constitutional deprivations that cannot be
remedied by the municipal liability theories the Supreme Court has endorsed to
date. Finally, in Part VI, I will briefly consider the potential remedial effects of
§ 1983 municipal liability claims based on unconstitutional "customs."
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER § 1983: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE

I.

Section I983 From Monroe to Monell

A.

The text of§ 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... , subjects, or causes to be subjected any
citizen of the United States . .. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. 22
For almost a century after its passage, the statute lay dormant as the federal
courts narrowly construed the "under color of' state law provision. 23 At the
same time, the Supreme Court took a restrictive view of the Privileges and
Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which § 1983 was created to
enforce. 24 Prior to the Court' s 1961 landmark decision in Monroe v. Pape, 25
22

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1996) (italics added).
See, e.g., Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 438-41 (1904) (holding that state
officers' conduct did not amount to state action because it was unauthorized and prohibited
by state law). As Susanah Mead has noted, however, "there is some question of whether the
Court ever really 'held' that the action of state officers in violation of state law could not
constitute the state action required under the Fourteenth Amendment." Susanah M. Mead,
Evolution of the 'Species of Tort liability' Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can Constitutional
Tort Be Saved From Extinction?, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. I, 18, n.90 (1986). Nevertheless, by
the mid-20th century, it was well-established that actions taken in violation of state law did
not constitute state action for purposes of§ 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 21217 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part) (citing numerous cases in discussing the
court' s prior construction of the "under color of' phrase).
24
See, e. g. , Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and
Slaughter-House Co. , 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 367, 378 (1873) (concluding that the "Privileges
and Immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not create any new substantive
rights that were not already inherent in national citizenship). The holding of the SlaughterHouse case effectively eliminated most civil rights from the purview of the Fourteenth
Amendment and severely limited the reach of § 1983. See, e.g., United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549-55 (1876) (finding that the Civil Rights Act of 1870 did not
provide a federal remedy for deprivation of the right to assemble peaceably because that
right pre-dated the Constitution and thus was not a right "granted or secured by the
Constitution," and that the Fourteenth Amendment does not address the deprivation of rights
by private citizens); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-25 (1883) (applying stringent
state-action requirements to a claim alleging deprivations of rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment in holding a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
23

24

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80: 17

plaintiffs could only invoke § 1983 when the unlawful action complained of
was "taken in either strict pursuance of some specific command of state law or
within the scope of executive discretion in the administration of state laws."26
Because states would rarely authorize a local official to violate a citizen's
constitutional rights, this narrow interpretation of the statute precluded federal
remedies in most cases. 27
The plaintiffs in Monroe, alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations, sought
damages under § 1983 against individual police officers and, under a
respondeat superior theory, against the officers' employer, the city of
Chicago.28 The Monroe Court greatly expanded the scope of § 1983 by
holding that the statute provides a remedy to persons deprived of constitutional

unconstitutional). The late Justice Blackmun observed that, with its rulings in the
Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights Cases, the Court "cut the heart out of the Civil
Rights Acts." Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights - Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 9 (1985); see
also Jack M. Beermann, The Supreme Court 's Narrow View on Civil Rights, 1993 SUP. CT.
R EV. 199, 204-11 ( 1993) (discussing the Court' s narrow interpretation of Reconstruction-era
amendments and legislation).
25
365 U.S . 167 (1961).
26
Id. at 213.
27
See, e.g., Barney, 193 U.S. at 430. Given the narrow interpretation of the statute and
the difficulty of showing state authorization for unconstitutional actions, it should be of little
surprise that only 21 cases were brought under § 1983 between 1871 and 1920. See
Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND.
L.J. 361, 363 (1951) (asserting that the disadvantages of § 1983, such as the narrow
holdings in The Slaughter House Cases and The Civil Rights Cases, coupled with the
statute's imprecise draftsmanship, explain the low volume of cases brought under the statute
during this period).
28
Petitioners' original complaint alleged the following: on October 29, 1958, at 5:45
a.m., thirteen Chicago police officers broke into the Monroe apartment and forced the
family at gunpoint to leave their beds and stand naked in the center of the living room; one
of the officers beat Mr. Monroe, calling him "nigger" and "black boy," while another officer
pushed Mrs. Monroe and hit and kicked the children; the police ransacked every room,
throwing clothing from closets to the floor, dumping drawers, ripping mattress covers; Mr.
Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on "open" charges for ten hours,
during which time he was interrogated about a murder and exhibited in lineups; he was not
brought before a magistrate, although numerous magistrates' courts were accessible; he was
not advised of his procedural rights; he was not permitted to call his family or an attorney,
and was subsequently released without criminal charges having been filed against him. In
taking these actions, the officers had failed to obtain a search or arrest warrant for Monroe
or anyone else. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 203 (Frankfurter, J. , dissenting). On the basis of
these allegations, the Monroe family sought damages against the individual police officers
and the City of Chicago. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim under§ 1983, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. See Monroe
v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365, 365-66 (7th Cir. I 960) (affirming the trial court's dismissal).
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rights by an official's abuse of position. 29 The Court held that litigants could
use § 1983 to remedy a constitutional injury inflicted by a local official whose
"[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law [was] made possible only
because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law."30 In
essence, Monroe opened every unconstitutional action taken in official
capacity to a potential § 1983 claim against the offending officer. 31 However,
the Monroe Court rejected plaintiffs claim against the City of Chicago,
holding that municipalities were not "persons" subject to suit within the
meaning of§ 1983.32
In the seventeen years between Monroe and Monell, the federal courts
confronted a number of issues resulting from the grant of absolute municipal
immunity. 33 In particular, problems arose where plaintiffs were completely
29
See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172. The Court further expanded the breadth of § 1983 by
holding that specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right is not required in order to
state a claim under the statute. Rather,§ 1983 claims must be read against the "background
of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his action." Id.
at 187. Finally, the Court held that a§ 1983 plaintiff need not first exhaust state judicial
remedies before proceeding in a federal forum. Id. at 183.
30
Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S . 299,326 (1941)).
31
Writing in 1965, Professor Shapo was prescient in describing the potential impact of
Monroe :
It thus appears that what is developing is a kind of 'constitutional tort.' It is not quite a
private tort, yet contains tort elements; it is not 'constitutional law,' but employs a
constitutional test . . . . It may well be argued that, given the broad language of
Monroe construing the already broad language of the statute, every policeman's tort
and every denial of a license by a state or local board will give rise to an action under §
1983.
Marshall Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.
L. REV. 277, 323-24 (1965).
32
See Monroe, 365 U.S. at I 87-92. The Monroe Court based its interpretation of the
statute on the 42nd Congress' refusal to adopt the proposed "Sherman Amendment." The
Sherman Amendment would have imposed liability on municipalities for damages caused
by private persons "riotously and tumultuously assembled." Id. at 188 (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 42nd Cong., I st Sess. 663 (1871 )). The Monroe Court found that the Congressional
refusal to hold municipalities liable for damages occasioned within their borders by third
parties demonstrated the intent that municipalities not be considered persons subject to
liability under§ 1983. Id. at 191. For a critique of the Court's legislative history analysis in
Monroe , see Ronald M. Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEO.
L.J. 1483, 1492-94 (1977) (written two years before Monell was decided, Levin argues that
Monroe's legislative history interpretation is incorrect and criticizes the municipal immunity
doctrine on public policy grounds); see also Reed Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 770 (1975); Note, Developing
Governmental Liability Under§ 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201 , 1207 (1971) (reasoning that
since the Monroe Court "actually faced an open choice as to whether or not municipalities
could be persons under § 1983 .... the court actually may have reached its decision on
policy grounds").
33
For example, a number of post-Monroe plaintiffs sought an end-run around municipal
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barred from seeking a federal remedy for constitutional injuries because of the
grant of absolute or qualified immunHy to individual officers, 34 coupled with
the absolute immunity of their municipal employers. 35 Under the thendeveloping doctrine of qualified immunity, an individual officer could escape
liability under the statute by proving that he had acted in good faith.36 Thus, if

immunity to damages by bringing actions against municipal officials in their "official
capacity," seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. See, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch.
Dist., 300 F. Supp. 794, 795 (S.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd, 427 F.2d 319 (1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 991 (1971) (black school teachers discharged from their positions brought § 1983
action against school board members and superintendent in their official capacity, seeking
equitable relief in the form of reinstatement); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 503 ( 1969) (plaintiffs sought equitable relief against school suspension
for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War). In City of Kenosha v. Bruno,
however, the Supreme Court sealed this loophole by extending Monroe's holding to shield
municipalities from declaratory and injunctive suits under§ 1983. See City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S . 507, 513 (1973) (holding that municipalities "are outside of[§ 1983' s]
ambit for purposes of equitable relief as well as for damages"). See generally, Don B.
Kates, Jr., Suing Municipalities and Other Public Entities Under the Federal Civil Rights
Act, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 177, 177 (1970) ("One of the most irksome technical problems
of litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . .. is the question of whether public entities are proper
defendants, and if so, for what forms of relief.").
34
Prior to Monro e, the Court had established absolute § I 983 immunity for several types
of government officials. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976)
(recognizing absolute immunity of prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55
(1967) (recognizing that absolute immunity of judges for "acts committed within their
judicial discretion" was preserved under§ 1983); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S . 367, 37275 (1951) (recognizing absolute immunity of legislators from liability under § I 983). In
two post-Monroe cases, the Court developed the doctrine of qualified immunity for certain
categories of executive officers sued under§ 1983. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
247 (1974) (finding that the Governor of Ohio and other executive officials involved in the
Kent State shootings had a qualified immunity from suit that varied with "the scope of the
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably
appeared at the time of the action"); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,322 ( 1975) (holding,
implicitly, that school officials were not liable for imposing disciplinary penalties so long as
they could not reasonably have known that their action violated students' constitutional
rights, and provided they did not act with malicious intent to cause constitutional or other
injury).
35 See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,343 (1976) (applying Monro e, the Court held
that a policeman who had been terminated from his employment without a pretermination
hearing could not sue his municipal employer under § 1983 because the municipality was
not a 'person' within the meaning of the statute).
36 Traditionally, qualified ("good faith") immunity ~ad both objective and subjective
components. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) ("The objective element
involves a presumptive knowledge of [constitutional rights] . . .. The subjective component
refers to ' permissible intentions."' quoting Wood, 420 U.S. at 322)). The Harlow court
rejected the subjective prong of the good faith standard, however, citing the high litigation
costs and resultant disruption to government that attended allegations of malice. See
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an officer deprived a citizen of a constitutional right, but had a good faith
belief that his actions were authorized by the municipality, the citizen-plaintiff
was left without a remedy against either the officer (because of qualified
immunity) or the municipality that authorized his unconstitutional actions
(because of absolute municipal immunity under Monroe).
Related problems arose as plaintiffs found that individual officers-who
were the only permissible defendants under Monroe-were often judgmentproof, or their identities were unknown.37 The petitioners in Monroe raised
this enforcement problem, but the Court did not pay it much heed. 38
In the mid-1970s, certain members of Congress introduced a bill for
consideration which would have made municipalities suable "persons" within
the meaning of§ 1983. 39 Before the bill was considered, however, the Court
decided Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York. 40
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-18 (articulating a new standard wherein "government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known"). Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
37 See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983 's
Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 786 (1992) (noting that even where a§ 1983 plaintiff
prevailed, "the officer was likely to be judgment-proof'); see also Susanah M. Mead, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65
N.C. L. REv. 517, 527 (1987) ("The individual actually responsible for the civil rights
violation may be difficult to identify, may be judgment-proof, or may be entitled to assert a
qualified or absolute immunity.").
38
As petitioners' attorneys and amici argued unsuccessfully in Monroe, holding
municipalities liable for constitutional torts is necessary "because private remedies against
officers ... are conspicuously ineffective, and because municipal liability will not only
afford plaintiffs responsible defendants but cause those defendants to eradicate abuses that
exist at the police level." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961). The Monroe Court,
however, did not reach these considerations. See also infra notes 45-54 and accompanying
text.
39 The proposed Civil Rights Improvement Act of 1977, considered by committees in
both the 95th and 96th Congresses, would have imposed liability on municipalities and their
agencies when officers or employees directly responsible for the conduct of the subordinate
officer or employee who committed such violation:
(A) directed, authorized, approved, or encouraged any action by such subordinate
officer or employee which resulted in such violation, or (B) failed to act in any manner
to remedy a pervasive pattern of unconstitutional or unlawful conduct engaged in by
such subordinate officer or employee which, in the absence of remedial action, was
likely to continue or recur in the future.
S. 35, 95th Cong. , 123 CONG. REC. I, 557-58 (1977).
40
436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, female employees of the Department of Social
Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York brought a§ 1983 class action
against the department, the board and its chancellor, and the city and its mayor. Plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants unconstitutionally and as a matter of official policy forced
pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence even where such leaves were not
medically necessary. The individual defendants were sued solely in their official capacities,
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In Monell, the Court once again considered whether municipal entities
should be included within the meaning of "persons" subject to liability under
the statute.41 Undertaking a "fresh analysis" of the legislative history of §
1983, the Court found that "Congress, in enacting [the statute], intended to
give a broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights."42 The
Court also found that the framers of § 1983 had urged that the statute be
construed "liberally" and with the "largest latitude" consistent with the Act's
remedial purpose to "aid [in] the preservation of human liberty and human
rights." 43 Applying this liberal construction to the language of the statute, the
Court declared that "it beggars reason to suppose that Congress would have
exempted municipalities from suit."44

with the plaintiffs seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants and back
pay for the periods of the allegedly unlawful forced leave. The district court held the claims
for declaratory and injunctive relief moot because the City of New York and the Board of
Education changed their maternity leave policies after the suit was filed. The lower court
then found the prior policy unconstitutional, but denied back pay because any such reward
would ultimately come from the city, thereby circumventing the absolute immunity of
municipalities under Monroe. The Second Circuit affirmed. See Monell v. Department of
Social Services of the City of New York, 532 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1976).
41
Monell, 436 U.S. at 668. The Monell Court reasoned that, while the rejected Sherman
Amendment would have made municipalities liable for acts in which they did not
participate, nothing in the legislative history indicated that municipalities could not be held
liable for their own fourteenth amendment violations. Id. at 683.
42 Monell, 436 U.S at 685 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., I st Sess. 68 ( 1871 )) ("As
has been again and again decided by your own Supreme Court of the United States ... the
largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in construing such
statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend and give remedies
for their wrongs to all the people.") (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
43 Id. at 684.
44
Id. at 687. "Since Congress intended [Section 1983] to be broadly construed, there is
no reason to suppose that municipal corporations would have been excluded from [its]
sweep." Id. at 686. Monell's holding of local government liability applies only to
compensatory damages; local governments are absolutely immune from punitive damages
liability. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981)
(reasoning that municipalities had absolute immunity from punitive damages at common
law and that such immunity was compatible with both the purposes of§ 1983 and general
public policy). As to compensatory damages, local governments, unlike individual officials,
are not protected by the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See, e.g. , Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,657 (1980) (stating that there is no trndition of immunity for
municipal corporations, and neither history nor policy supports a construction of§ I 983 that
would justify municipal qualified immunity). Additionally, state sovereign immunity rules
cannot be applied by state courts to bar§ 1983 claims against local governments. See, e.g.,
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S . 356, 367-83 (1990) (finding that the Supremacy Clause mandates
that state courts must hear § 1983 claims brought in a court otherwise competent to hear that
type of claim).
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The Monell Court also analyzed the statute's cause in fact language45 and
found that it precluded the application of respondeat superior to § 1983
liability.46 Consequently, the Court concluded that § 1983 municipal liability
would only apply when "execution of a government's policy or custom"
inflicts the injury. 47 Through this "policy or custom" requirement, the Court
purported to insulate municipalities from automatic vicarious liability under
the statute and to ensure that claimants firmly establish the causal connection
between municipal action and constitutional 1.njury.48
The Rationale Behind Municipal Liability

B.

Mone/l 's holding that municipalities could be held liable under § 1983 has
profound implications for promoting the statute' s goals of compensation and
deterrence. First, municipal liability for civil rights violations is a precondition
to any meaningful recovery of money damages given the development of the
qualified immunity defense49 and other well-chronicled difficulties of litigating
45

See Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978) ("[A]ny person who . .. shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person .. . to
the deprivation of any rights .. .. ").
46
See id. at 691-92 (ruling that "a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory"). In addition, the Court considered two policy justifications for
respondeat superior liability-accident reduction and loss-spreading under an insurance
approach-but found that Congress had rejected both justifications during the legislative
debates on § 1983. See id. at 693-94.
47
Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
48 Specifically, the Court found that "the language of § 1983, read against the
background of the same legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not
intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of
some nature caused a constitutional tort," and therefore "a municipality cannot be held liable
solely because it employs a tortfeasor." Id. at 691. As Professor Nahmod has argued, there
are sound policy reasons for not applying respondeat superior theory to § 1983 cases:
Respondeat superior in tort law is the functional equivalent of strict liability. Because
strict liability focuses on risk allocation, it has been characterized as inappropriate in a
§ 1983 setting. Also, in a tort context, the master usually bears some responsibility for
choice of servants, while a superior defending a § 1983 action frequently has not
chosen his or her subordinates .
. . . Consequently, in light of Monell and these policy reasons, the superior does not and
should not invariably have a constitutional duty, solely by reason of position, to
compensate a person whose constitutional rights have been violated by subordinates.
What is required in order for the superior to have such a duty is that the superior
personally act unconstitutionally as well. That is, the superior must have possessed the
requisite state of mind for the constitutional violation and must have played a causal
role in plaintiff s constitutional deprivation.
I SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 3.22, at 239 (3d
ed. 1991) (footnotes omitted).
49
See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818 (holding that individual officials
performing discretionary functions are generally "shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
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claims against individual officers.so The reality is that individual officers are
not often forced to pay damage awards from their own pockets.SI If damage
awards are levied, local and state governments often provide for
indernnification,s 2 though these indemnification provisions are themselves
wrought with uncertainty and difficulties.s 3
Most significantly,

rights").
50 Some commentators have recognized that § 1983 suits against individual defendants
rarely achieve the compensatory goal of the statute because of plaintiffs' inability to
identify the particular government official who caused the harm, and the inability of
individual officials to satisfy judgments against them. See Mead, supra note 37, at 539.
Also, juries may be more sympathetic to lower-level officials and thus less inclined to return
verdicts against them. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants:
Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 548 (199~)
("[J]urors' general sense of fairness mitigates against blaming an officer for causing a
constitutional injury when he merely carried out department policy as an obedient
employee."); Jon 0 . Newman, Suing the Lnwbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section
1983 Damage Remedy for Lnw Enforcers ' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 456-57 (1978)
(noting that jurors are often unaware of the state's indemnification policies and therefore
"understandably su~cumb[ ] easily to the argument, stated or implied, that recovery should
be denied because the damages must come from the paycheck of a hard-working, underpaid
police officer"); PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 15 (1983) (apart from officials'
immunities, "shallow pockets . . . are likely to make suits against individual officials
unavailable as a practical matter").
51
See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REY. 641, 686 (1987) (noting that in a survey of cases where
payments to victims of constitutional wrongs were recorded, "no case . . . showed that an
individual official had borne the cost of an adverse constitutional tort judgment").
52
See, e.g. , ALA. CODE§ 41-9-74 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 41-621 (West Supp.
1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-203 (Michie 1987); CAL. GOY' T CODE§ 825 (1980); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-10-1 lO(l)(b)(I) (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-16a, 7-465 (West
Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4001-4002 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ch. 111.071
(1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-9-60 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-903(b), (c) (1975); 65 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-4-5 (West 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 669.1 et seq. (West 1993);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-6101-6116 (1984); LA. REY. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:5108.1-5108.2
(West Supp. 1985); ME. REY. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8112 (West 1980); Mo. CODE ANN.,
STATE Gov'T §§ 12-404, 12-405 (1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1408 (West Supp.
1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-1- 47(2) (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105-711 ( West Supp.
1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305 (1985); NEY. REY. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.0349-035
(Michie 1983); N.H. REY. STAT. ANN. §§ 31 :105, 31:106, 99-D:2 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59:10-1 to -4 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41 -4-4 (Michie 1985); N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW§ 50-j (McKinney Supp. 1984); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW§ 17(3)(a) (McKinney Supp.
1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-167 (1983); OR. REY. STAT. § 30.285 (1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS§ 9-31-12 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 3-19-1 to -2 (Michie 1980); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 104.002(a)(2) () (West 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-36 to
-37 (Supp. 1985); w. V.A. CODE§ 8-12-7(b) (1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.46 (West 1983
& Supp. 1985); WYO. STAT. ANN. § l-39- 104(c) (Michie Supp. 1985).
53
Section 1983 plaintiffs can hardly rely on state indemnification provisions as a
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indemnification statutes invariably afford the municipality the unilateral option
of disclaiming coverage in broad categories of cases. 54 A system of municipal
liability better serves the compensatory goal of § 1983 because it affords
victims of constitutional wrongs the confidence that there exists a defendant
from which they may actually recover compensatory damages.
Municipal liability also serves the deterrence goal of § 1983 better than
individual officer liability. Some commentators have argued that "when
individual officials are held personally liable for their violations of law, they
are likely to be overdeterred by their fear of suit and engage in self-protective
behavior at the cost of vigorous performance of their duties." 55 Aside from the
overdeterrence of individual officers, it seems clear that where liability falls
solely on individual officers, municipalities have little incentive to develop
comprehensive responses to rampant unconstitutional practices. Municipalities
generally write off the misconduct of an individual officer to the "bad apple
theory," under which municipal governments or their agencies attribute
misconduct to aberrant behavior by a single "bad apple," thereby deflecting
attention from systemic and institutional factors contributing to recurring
constitutional deprivations. 56 The "bad apple theory" is essentially an

guarantee of compensation for constitutional injuries committed by local law enforcement
officers. These indemnification provisions tend to differ significantly as to the scope of
coverage, extent of local autonomy over terms and conditions of reimbursement, and limits
on amounts of reimbursement. See generally SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT, supra note 50,
at 88 (discussing the many variations among state indemnification statutes).
54
For example, section 50-k of the New York General Municipal Law allows New York
City to disclaim indemnification of officials for actions that violate any rule or regulation of
the agency, or that are intentional or reckless, or that fall outside the scope of employment.
See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW§ 50-k(3). Essentially, any serious constitutional tort provides
the City of New York the option of disclaiming coverage. In general, most state and local
indemnification statutes provide for denial of reimbursement on similarly broad grounds,
making "indemnification ... neither certain nor universal." SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT,
supra note 50, at 85; see also William C. Mathes & Robert T. Jones, Toward a "Scope of
Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889, 912
(1965) ("[l]t appears that the indemnity practice is so irregular that its function as a 'conduit
to governmental liability' is fortuitous at best.").
55
Note, Government Tort Liability, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2009, 2018 (1998); see also
Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases,
57 WASH. L. REv. 635, 640 (1982) (arguing that the imposition of tort remedies may
overdeter police officers because these officers personally pay for violations, but are not
then compensated for lawful activity); SCHUCK, supra note 50, at 76 (arguing that the threat
of suit may lead police officers to avoid conduct that they view as "close to the line" and
therefore fail to discharge their duties properly).
56
In the police context, one report found that "[t]hose who claim that each high-profile
human rights abuse is an aberration, committed by a 'rogue' officer, are missing the point:
human rights violations persist in large part because the accountability systems are so
defective." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, supra note 12, at 2. Others have noted that the
tendency to latch onto the "bad apple" theory of police brutality and misconduct can prove
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institutionalized belief system ensuring that fault for unconstitutional
conduct-even when it results in large damage awards against individual
officers or city-approved settlements-will never be localized in the culture of
the municipal agency itself. Holding the municipality itself liable for injuries
caused by its officials makes it more difficult to take refuge in the "bad apple
theory" and more likely that the municipality will take steps to remedy the
broader problems. 57 Furthermore, municipal entities "possess the resources and
broad vantage point with which to identify the particular deficiencies, and ...
take appropriate corrective action," 58 thereby furthering the deterrence goal of
§ 1983.
C.

Early Formulations of the "Policy" Basis for Establishing Municipal
Liability

Monell itself was a "clear case" for finding municipal liability based on a
"policy."59 There, a written city-wide policy requiring pregnant women to take
unpaid maternity leaves before such leaves were medically necessary directly
caused plaintiffs' injuries. 60 Because the existence of an unconstitutional
official policy was evident, the Court left "to another day" a determination of

an intractable problem to reforming police practices. For example, Cohen and Feldberg
argue that police apologists often resort to the "bad apple" theory of police immorality in
response to the periodic public scrutiny occasioned by an act of police misconduct:
[I]n response to documented cases of corruption and brutality, police administrators
would declare them merely isolated deeds by "bad apple" officers. Bad apples were
morally corrupt individuals, rotten on the inside and hiding under a skin of
respectability, and who were only out for themselves. The vast majority of officers
(the remainder of the barrel), [the public was] assured, were morally upstanding and
beyond temptation or excess. The rotten apples needed removal so that the barrel's
other apples would not be contaminated; police administrators and apologists never
conceded that the barrel might, itself, have been contaminated, much less that it might
be the source of the problem.
How ARD s. COHEN & MICHAEL FELDBERG, POWER AND REsTRAINT: THE MORAL DIMENSION
OFPOLICEWORK 10-11 (1991).
57 See, e.g., Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. R.Ev. 5, 49-50 (1980)
(arguing that imposing direct liability on local governments would induce the "systemic
changes" necessary to correct many constitutional injuries resulting from '"systemic
problems' within government institutions, rather than from the specific acts of one who
superficially may appear to be responsible").
58
Note, supra note 55, at 2019.
59 See Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
713 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that although there are "substantial line-drawing
problems in determining 'when execution of a government's policy or custom"' results in
municipal liability, Monell is a "clear case" because it "involves formal, written policies of a
municipal department" (emphasis added)).
60
See id. at 661-62 (female employees seeking backpay for periods of forced leave under
official policy).
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"the full contours of municipal liability."61
The Court has since decided ten cases implicating Mone/l's "policy or
custom" requirement. 62 The plaintiffs in all of these cases premised their
claims of municipal liability on the existence of an unconstitutional "policy,"63

61
Id. at 695. In the short run, the Court left this task not to another day, but to the lower
federal courts, leading to diverse and often conflicting results. See, e.g., infra note 85 and
accompanying text (discussing the disagreement among lower courts over what constitutes
final policymaking authority for purposes of municipal liability).
62 See Board of County Comm' rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
( 1997) (ruling that in addition to identifying conduct attributable to the municipality, "a
plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of
culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights"); Jett v. Dallas lndep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 736-37 (I 989)
(remanding case to lower court to determine whether the decisions of the superintendent of a
school district "represent the official policy of the local governmental unit" in the area of
employee transfers); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-91 (1989) (finding
that a municipality may be held liable under the statute for failing to train its employees if
such failure is "deliberately indifferent" to the rights of citizens); City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (I 988) (finding that the mere failure of supervisory officials
to review a subordinate's wrongful decision to lay off plaintiff "does not amount to a
delegation of policymaking authority"); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986) (per curiam) (ruling that a jury's finding that a police officer committed no
constitutional injury precludes a finding of basis for municipal liability against the city);
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986) (finding that only decisions of
those "officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in
question" may form the basis for municipal liability under§ 1983); City of Oklahoma City
v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (finding that a single act of excessive force by a
police officer cannot by itself establish proof of a "policy" of inadequate training for
municipal liability); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. I, 22 (1985) (remanding case to lower
court to determine whether the policy of the police department rendered it liable under
Monell for the unconstitutional use of deadly force by an individual police officer); Brandon
v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1985) (ruling that plaintiffs may amend their pre-Monell
action to add city as defendant because they had originally sued the director of the city's
police department in his official capacity); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833
( 1998) (allegation that police engaged in high-speed chase were deliberately indifferent to
passenger's survival found insufficient to state substantive due process claim for purposes of
municipal liability under§ 1983).
In another case, the Court unanimously rejected the "heightened pleading standard" in
cases alleging municipal liability, concluding that "[i]n the absence of .. . an amendment [to
Rules 8 and 9(b)], federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control
of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims." Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993).
63
Even a cursory review of the post-Monell cases reveals that the Court has had apparent
difficulty building a majority behind a clear statement of what constitutes municipal
"policy" for purposes of § 1983 liability. There was no majority opinion in Tuttle or
Praprotnik, with three of the Justices writing separately in each case. Similarly, there were
five separate opinions in Pembaur, with the Justices turning to their vast collection of
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rather than "custom. "64
Many commentators have criticized the "policy" requirement as an artificial
and misguided limitation on municipal liability, arguing that a respondeat
superior regime is the more direct and efficient method of determining liability
under § 1983. 65 But a significant line of post-Monell Supreme Court
jurisprudence strongly suggests that "policy," however muddled and
indeterminate, is here to stay.66 This Article does not argue that the "policy"
requirement should be overruled, nor that the "policy" rule of Monell is
deficient insofar as it seeks to ensure that municipalities are only liable for
injuries they directly cause. Rather, this Article contends that "policy" fails to
dictionaries in an attempt to arrive at a concise and applicable definition of "policy." See
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481 n.9 (citing the various definitions of "policy" in Webster' s Third
New International Dictionary, Oxford English Dictionary, Webster' s New Twentieth
Century Dictionary, and Random House Dictionary). This confusion over the definition of
"policy" is largely the result of the lack of precedent and guidance as to the meaning of the
term when it was first announced in Monell. See Mead, supra note 37, at 542-43 (noting
that "policy" is a complex judicial creation of the Monell Court that does not appear in the
language of § 1983). Accordingly, the Court's rulings in this area have been widely
criticized for their lack of coherence. See id. at 542-46 (discussing the "especially
problematic" definition of "policy" in Monell) ; Robert A. Callahan, Note, "Policymaker"
Identification in a Section 1983 Cause of Action: From Monell to Praprotnik; Problems
Remain, 40 DRAKE L. REv. 149, 166 (1991) (noting the Court' s incoherence in defining
"policy" broadly in some cases to include "unwritten rules ... that need not govern future
situations," while using a narrow definition in other cases to limit it to "rules adopted
through careful thought processes ... intended to govern similar situations in the future") .
64 See, e.g., Jett, 491 U.S. at 736-37 (whether the racially motivated decision of a school
principal and superintendent to reassign. plaintiff to another school represented the school
district's "official policy"); Harris, 489 U.S. at 388-91 (whether a city's failure to train
police officers to determine when an injured detainee might require medical assistance
constitutes actionable city "policy") ; Praprotnik, 485 U.S . at 129-30 (whether the failure to
review the propriety of a subordinate' s decision to lay off plaintiff by supervisory officials
with the authority to set employment policy renders the municipality liable); Pembaur, 475
U.S. at 484-85 (whether County Prosecutor' s decision to order a forceful entry constitutes
an "official policy"); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24 (whether a single act of excessive force by a
police officer can constitute a "policy" of inadequate training); Garner, 471 U.S. at 15-22
(whether the policy of the police department to allow the use of deadly force to prevent the
escape of any felony suspect is unconstitutional).
65 See, e.g., Larry Kramer & Alan 0 . Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REv. 249, 283-87, 294-96, 301 (arguing that the
'"policy rule' of Monell serves no intelligible purpose" and should be "abandoned in favor
of common-law agency principles, including the doctrine of respondeat superior"); Mead,
supra note 37, at 538-42 (arguing that respondeat superior better serves the policy purposes
of§ 1983); Note, supra note 55, at 2019 ("[R]espondeat superior liability for municipalities
under § 1983 would better effectuate the policy goals of vigorous decisionmaking and
deterrence of violations.").
66 See supra note 64 (citing cases in which the Court evaluated the claims of municipal
liability on the basis of Mone/l 's "policy rule").
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capture the recurring, pervasive constitutional violations by low-level officials
for which§ 1983 was intended to provide a remedy. This Article argues that,
even absent an official "policy," § 1983 plaintiffs can establish municipal
liability in the forgotten "custom" language of the statute.

II. THE PROBLEMS WITH "POLICY"
The result of the Court's concentration on the "policy" basis for imposing
municipal liability in its ten post-Monell cases has been the proliferation of
overlapping "policy" pigeonholes. While the Court's jurisprudence in this area
"manifestly needs clarification,"67 it is possible to tease out of this tangle three
somewhat distinct models of "policy." As this Part will demonstrate, however,
all three "policy" models suffer from a common defect in that they focus
exclusively and unrealistically on high-level city officials and virtually ignore
the unconstitutional actions of low-level officials.
The "Quasi-Legislative Model "

A.

The first paradigm of "policy" is what I call the "quasi-legislative model."
This model defines policy as "a deliberate choice to follow a course of
action ... made from among various alternatives by the official or officials
responsible for establishing final policy."68 The quasi-legislative model is
endorsed by a majority of Justices and treats as actionable under § 1983 those
policies "made up of specific, concrete actions taken with some thought," such
as legislative enactments. 69 The lower federal courts have followed similar
standards for determining what constitutes municipal policy under the quasilegislative model. 70
67

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 121.
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483. See also Tuttle , 471 U.S. at 823 (defining policy as "a
course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives"); City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 252, 253 n.7 (1981) (vote of City Council to cancel
license for rock concert constitutes municipal policy); Owen v. City of Independence, Mo.,
445 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1980) (decision by City Council to release investigative reports
constitutes official city policy); Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 713 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (finding that the uncontested
existence of a "formal, written polic[y ]" represented a "clear case" for municipal liability).
69
Woodley v. Town of Nantucket, 645 F. Supp. 1365, 1378 (D. Mass. 1986).
70
See, e.g., Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1053-55 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that
city ordinance regulating disposal of property seized during criminal investigation violates
due process and constitutes city "policy" for which the city is liable); Bateson v. Geisse, 857
F.2d 1300, 1303-04 (9th Cir. l 988) (finding decision of the City Council, a "properly
constituted legislative body," to arbitrarily withhold issuing plaintiffs building permit in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment an act of "official government policy"); Little v.
City of North Miami, 805 F.2d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (finding that
resolution adopted by City Council in violation of the First Amendment meets requirements
for municipal liability); Evers v. County of Custer, 745 F.2d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 1984)
(finding the declaration of a public road by a county's governing body official policy).
68
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Monell is the archetypal quasi-legislative case because it involved a written
formal rule, which the Court found unconstitutional on its face.7 1 Two other
post-Monell Supreme Court cases also fit the quasi-legislative model because
in both elected city councils voted in favor of and approved the challenged
conduct. In Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 72 the City Council voted
to release investigative reports involving the Chief of Police's handling of the
property room, which subsequently led to his dismissal from office. 73 The
Court left undisturbed the determination of the court of appeals that the
decision of the City Council to release the reports constituted "the
municipality's official policy . . . responsible for the <;leprivation of [the
plaintiffs] constitutional rights." 74 Similarly, in City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 75 the City Council voted to cancel the entertainment license of a
music promoter. 76 The Court upheld the jury's finding that the license
cancellation amounted to content-based censorship in violation of the First
Amendment, and the Council's vote constituted policy for purposes of
municipal liability under the statute. 77
Since the early 1980s, the quasi-legislative model has played no part in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, and has surfaced infrequently in lower court
cases. 78 Rarely (one assumes) will modem-day policymakers be found sitting
71

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 713 (Powell, J. , concurring) (noting that because "[t]hi s
case . .. involves formal, written policies . .. it is the clear case" for municipal liability); see
also Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 122 ("In Monell itself, it was undisputed that there had been an
official policy requiring city employees to take actions that were unconstitutional under this
Court's decisions.").
72
445 U.S. 622 (1980).
73
See id. at 628-29.
74
Id. at 632-33. The district court entered judgment for the city, City Manager and
members of the City Council, finding that plaintiffs discharge did not deprive him of any
constitutionally protected property interest or liberty interest. See id. at 630 n. I 0. The court
of appeals reversed, finding that the release of the investigative reports by the City Council
"had blackened [plaintiff s] name and reputation, thus depriving him of liberty without due
process of law." Id. at 631. Nonetheless, the court of appeals found the city was entitled to
qualified immunity from liability based on ttie good faith of its officials. See id. at 634. The
Supreme Court left undisturbed the finding that the city had violated plaintiff s
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 633 n.13. The only issue
before the Owen Court was whether the city could rely on the good faith of its officials as a
shield to§ 1983 liability, to which the Court responded in the negative. See id. at 653-58.
75
453 U.S. 247 (1981).
76
See id. at 251-52.
77
See id. at 253 n.7. The Court addressed only the issue of whether municipalities could
be held liable for punitive damages under § 1983, and found that municipalities were
immune from punitive damages under the statute based on the common-law and public
policy considerations. See id. at 258-71.
78
See, e.g., Kopf v. Wing, 942 F.2d 265, 269 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that "written
policies are carefully crafted to be constitutional, and a plaintiff must usually prove the
existence of some unpublished practice" to establish municipal liability under§ 1983); Peter
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in a smoke-filled backroom discussing whether to direct local officials to
trammel the constitutional rights of the citizenry. Rather, the paradigmatic
§ 1983 complaints of this era-especially amongst minority groups in urban
centers--concem issues of police brutality, false arrests and other forms of
official misconduct that, by their very nature, are not the subject of deliberative
discussion among municipal decisionmakers. 79 It would be unduly cynical,
and empirically unwarranted, to suggest that these pervasive unconstitutional
practices are the product of "a deliberate choice . . . among various
altematives"80 by municipal policymakers.

B.

The "Official Action" Model

The second paradigm of "policy," which I term the "official action model,"
finds policy in the actions of "decisionrnaker[s] possess[ing] final authority to
establish municipal policy with respect to the [complained of] action." 81
Under this broader conception of municipal fault, 82 a § 1983 plaintiff may
attribute to the municipality actions of supervisory personnel whose "acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy." 83 As such, this model seems to
H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort Law and
Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1772 (1989) (noting that few § 1983 municipal
liability cases involving fonnal rules or written policies have reached the lower courts in the
post-Monell era).
79
As a noted civil rights attorney has stated, while Monell "gave police misconduct
litigators a real, although circumscribed, avenue to sue the offending municipality under §
1983 ... the vast majority of cases in the police misconduct field did not implicate a formal,
written policy ... chargeable to the municipality." G. Aint Taylor, Municipal Liability
Litigation in Police Misconduct Cases From Monroe to Praprotnik and Beyond, 19 CUMB.
L. REV. 447,452 (1989).
80 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986).
81
See id. at 481. Pembaur involved two deputy sheriffs who attempted to serve arrest
warrants on a doctor' s employees. See id. at 472. When the doctor locked the door to the
clinic and denied them entrance, the deputies phoned the assistant county prosecutor to ask
what they should do, and the prosecutor ordered them to "go in and get" the witnesses. See
id. at 473. After police officers chopped down the doctor's door with an axe, the deputies
entered and searched the clinic, but did not find the individuals for whom the warrants had
been issued. See id. The doctor subsequently brought a § 1983 suit against the city, the
county and various individual officials, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. See id. at 473-74. The Supreme Court found the prosecutor had acted
as the "final decisionmaker for the county" in ordering the deputies to enter the clinic, and
the county could therefore be held liable for constitutional violations resulting from the
prosecutor's order. Id. at 484-85.
82
As evident in Pembaur, the "official action" model extends § 1983 municipal liability
beyond facially unconstitutional written policies (e.g., Monell) or unconstitutional decisions
by duly elected city councils (e.g., Owen and Fact Concerts). See id. at 480 ("[T]he power
to establish policy is no more the exclusive province of the legislature at the local level than
at the state or national level.").
83
Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S . 658, 694
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suggest that if a high-ranking official establishes a policy that when executed
by a low-level official or a subordinate leads to a constitutional violation, both
the local government and the official may be held liable under § 1983, even
though the municipality did not formally declare the policy itself. 84
Applying the official action model in a number of post-Monell municipal
liability cases has proven difficult. 85 Further, the search in each case for
municipal officials who possess something called "final authority to establish
municipal policy" 86 has bred persistent conflicts among the lower courts and
sharp divisions among the Justices themselves, 87 making the "official action"
model an increasingly uncertain basis for municipal liability. 88 Therefore,
while the Court has busied itself trying to flesh out the contours of the official
action model, 89 cases basing municipal liability on this model are rare.90

(1978).
84 See, e.g., Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484-85 (concluding that a municipality may incur §
1983 liability for a single decision or act by a supervisory official with "final authority to
establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered").
85
The Court has struggled to answer a number of complex questions in its application of
the official action model. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Di st., 491 U.S. 701 , 737
(1989) (how to identify the official with "final policymaking authority" concerning the
particular action in question, and whether the trial judge or the jury should make such
determination); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123-28 (1988) (what
deference to give state and local law in determining who has "final policymaking authority"
in a particular area of a municipality's business); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-85 (whether a
single decision in by an individual official in an isolated case may constitute policy).
86 Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481 .
87 See, e.g., Praprotnik, 485 U.S at 144 (Brennan, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the
plurality's ruling that the identification of officials having "final policymaking authority" is
a question _o f state law and should not be submitted to the jury). See also Callahan, Note,
supra note 63, at 164 (noting that "the Court has been unable to reach majority consensus as
to the proper standards for determining whether a municipal official is a policymaker . . .
[and a]s a result . .. the lower federal courts have been struggling to . .. determin[e] whether
a municipal official is a policymaker").
88 Even when plaintiffs base their claims of municipal liability on the "official action"
model, they are rarely successful because the search for one who possesses "final
policymaking authority" seems to operate as a form of municipal immunity. As Professor
Shuck has argued, "[i]n the many cases in which official policy is not (as it is in Monell)
embodied in a straightforward, published rule promulgated by a highly visible political
organ such as a city council, so crabbed an inquiry [into who is a "final policymaker"] is
unlikely to identify those situations in which the government should properly be held
responsible for constitutional injuries to citizens." Schuck, supra note 78, at 1774-75.
89 As Professor Nahmod has noted, "[a]fter Monell, considerable litigation has centered
around the question of the standards to be used in determining which high-ranking officials
make policy and under what circumstances." NAHMOD, supra note 48, § 6.09, at 431.
90 Indeed, there seem only to be a handful of "official action" cases decided by'the lower
federal courts. See, e.g., Brown v. Reardon, 770 F.2d 896, 901 (10th Cir. 1985) (ruling that
city is not liable to former employees who were allegedly terminated for failing to
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Instead, most lower federal court cases involving claims of municipal liability
are based on allegations of recurring, unconstitutional local practices by rank.and-file officers, rather than singular actions by higher ranking municipal
officials. 91
This inability to address constitutional misconduct by low-level officials
through the "official action" model is well illustrated by City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik. 92 Praprotnik, a city employee who had been demoted and finally
discharged, brought a claim against his four supervisors and the city of St.
Louis. He claimed that these adverse personnel decisions constituted a denial
of due process and a violation of the First Amendment. 93 A jury exonerated
the individual defendants but held the city liable. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court reversed with respect to the
individual defendants, finding that petitioner's supervisors did not have
policymaking authority over his demotion and discharge. Looking to language
of the St. Louis city charter,94 the Court identified the Civil Service

contribute to political fund because the alleged misconduct was attributable only to lowlevel employees whose actions do not constitute city policy); McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d
1367, 1374-75 (10th Cir. 1984) (ruling that sheriffs office could be held liable for
constitutional violations carried out by sheriff, who is official responsible for the policies of
the office); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 448 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding that city would be liable if plaintiff can prove that the mayor directed a
campaign to stigmatize him because the mayor is a city official whose acts represent
municipal policy).
91
See, e.g., Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 989-90 (7th Cir. 1988) (systematic
practice of withholding exculpatory evidence from defense); Owens v. City of Atlanta, 780
F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988) (pervasive use of potentially lethal types of restraining
techniques); Hindman v. City of Paris, Tex., 746 F.2d 1063, 1065-66 (5th Cir. 1984)
(practice of obtaining arrest warrants without adequate probable cause).
92 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
93
Praprotnik was an architect employed by the city of St. Louis. By 1980, he was
serving in a management-level planning position in the St. Louis Community Development
Agency. Up until that point, he had received favorable annual performance evaluations.
Later that year, Praprotnik received a 15-day suspension for accepting private clients
without prior approval . He appealed the suspension to the Civil Service Commission, which
reversed the suspension and awarded him backpay. Praprotnik's supervisors were
apparently displeased with the Commission's decision and his next two annual job
performance evaluations were less favorable than in previous years. He appealed both
evaluations to the city's personnel department and received partial relief. In 1982, due to
municipal budget cuts, the Community Development Agency downsized and transferred
Praprotnik to what he considered a dead-end job. Praprotnik objected to the transfer and
appealed to the Civil Service Commission once again. The Commission declined to hear
the appeal because there had been no reduction in pay or grade. In December 1983,
allegedly due to lack of funds, Praprotnik was laid off. See id. at 114-17.
94
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, noted that the identification of
policymaking officials is always a question of state or local law: "[W]e can be confident that
state law (which may include valid local ordinances and regulations) will always direct a
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Commission as the final personnel policymaker for the city. 95 Given that the
Commission had not directly acted to deny petitioner due process, the Court
found no basis for imposing municipal liability. 96
The Court of Appeals in Praprotnik had held the city liable under § 1983
based on its finding that the Commission had accorded great deference to some
lower-level personnel actions and failed to review others at all. The Praprotnik
plurality, however, rejected this (realistic) view that municipalities govern
through high-level officials delegating policymaking authority to low-level
officials.97 Instead, the plurality found that acquiescence in a subordinate' s
decisions is not a delegation of policymaking authority because "[i]t is equally
consistent with a presumption that the subordinates are faithfully attempting to
comply with the policies that are supposed to guide them."98
Of course, low-level officials without "final policymaking authority" take
actions every day which affect the constitutional rights of the citizenry, and
these actions may be acquiesced in or simply unknown to high-level officials. 99
Under Praprotnik and its progeny, the exercise of discretion by low-level
officials does not constitute the formulation of policy sufficient to establish
municipal liability. Likewise, the failure of high-level officials to investigate
the basis of these discretionary decisions is also insufficient to establish
municipal liability. 100 At its furthest extreme, this formalistic approach ensures
that "even the hollowest promise of review is sufficient to divest all city

court to some official or body that has the responsibility for making law or setting policy in
any given area of local government' s business." See id. at 125-26.
95
See id.
96
See id. at 129-30.
97 The Praprotnik plurality did note that, "[a]mong the many kinds of municipal
corporations, political subdivisions, and special districts of all sorts, one may expect to find
a rich variety of ways in which the power of government is distributed among a host of
different officials and official bodies." Id. at 124-25 (citing CHARLES S. RHYNE, THE LAW OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS§§ 1.3-1.7 ( 1980)). Having acknowledged the difficulties
involved in determining the locus of policymaking power within different municipal
organizations, the Court nevertheless found that state or local law is the final arbiter on these
issues. See id.
98
Id. at 130.
99 In a separate concurrence, Justice Brennan argued that the plurality opinion "turns a
blind eye to reality" by ignoring the possibility that "[r]eviewing officials ... may as a
matter of practice never invoke their plenary oversight authority, or their review powers
may be highly circumscribed," so that "the subordinate' s decision is in effect the final
municipal pronouncement on the subject." See id. at 145-46 (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment).
100
See id. at 129-30 (" [T]he mere failure to investigate the basis of a subordinate's
discretionary decisions [in the absence of a particular decision by the subordinate that is
expressly approved by a supervisory policymaker, or a series of decisions by a subordinate
of which the supervisor must have been aware] does not amount to a delegation of
policymaking authority . ... ").
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officials save the mayor and governing legislative body of final policymaking
authority." 101
In short, while low level officials are most often the target of § 1983
litigation, the official action model fails, in most respects, to capture their
unconstitutional conduct by assuming that they can only act under command of
high-level officials. The latter group, meanwhile, remain either unidentified or
insulated by the complexity of municipal bureaucracy and the Court's refusal
to acknowledge delegation or abdication of final policymaking authority in
critical circumstances. 102
C.

The "Failure to [Blank]" Model

A third view, which might be termed the "failure to [blank:]" 103 model, finds
policy in municipal failures to train, 104 supervise, 105 discipline, 106 or otherwise
101

Id. at 146. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) For Justice Brennan, the plurality's
opinion essentially permits "municipalities to insulate themselves from liability for the acts
of all but a small minority of actual city policymakers." Id. at 132. See also Board of
Comm' rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 435 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court's "policymaker" cases "require[] federal courts to explore state and
municipal law that distributes different state powers among different local officials and local
entities ... That law is highly specialized; it may or may not say just where policymaking
authority lies, and it can prove particularly difficult to apply .. .. ").
wz Justice Brennan, arguing that juries should be allowed to determine who was a final
policymaker, criticized the Praprotnik plurality for its narrow view of final policymaking
authority: "the law is concerned not with the niceties of legislative draftsmanship but with
the realities of municipal decisionmaking, and any assessment of a municipality's actual
power structure is necessarily a factual and practical one." See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 145.
See generally George D. Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 and the
Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism: A Comment on City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle and
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The "Official Policy" Cases, 27 B.C. L. REv. 883 (I 986);
Terrence S. Welch & Kent S. Hofmeister, Praprotnik, Municipal Policy and Policymakers:
The Supreme Court's Constriction of Municipal Liability, 13 S. ILL. U. L.J. 857 ( 1989).
103 I use this term to indicate the malleability of this model of municipal liability: simply
fill in the "blank" and you have a § 1983 municipal liability claim.
104
See, e.g. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989) ("[T]here are limited
circumstances in which an allegation of a 'failure to train' can be the basis for liability under
§ 1983."); Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1344 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[A] municipality may,
in restricted circumstances, be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations
resulting from its failure to train its police officers."); Young v. City of Augusta, Georgia,
59 F.3d 1160, 1171 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding a§ 1983 claim against a municipality for
failure to train valid only "if the deficiency reflects deliberate indifference by City
policymakers to the rights of inmates .. .. ").
w5 See, e.g., Ruehman v. Village of Palos Park, 842 F. Supp. 1043, l058 (N.D. Ill. 1993),
aff d, 34 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that "deliberate indifference" of a municipality
toward false arrests could only be established through a showing that the municipality is
"aware that persons are being arrested on incorrectly listed warrants or, at a minimum, it is
shown such arrests are so likely to occur that failure to have additional validation procedures
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control individual officers. While lower federal courts have considered a
variety of claims seemingly founded on the "failure to [blank]" model, the
Supreme Court, thus far, has recognized the "failure to [blank]" model only in
the context of police officer training. 107 Specifically, the Court has held that
where "the need for more or different training" of municipal officers or
employees is "so obvious," and this inadequacy is "so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights," municipal policymakers can reasonably be
said to have been "deliberately indifferent." 108 The failure to provide proper
training, therefore, represents a policy for which the city may be held liable. 109
The "failure to [blank]" model, as developed in the lower federal courts, has
provided plaintiffs' attorneys with a variety of municipal liability claims under
§ 1983. Under this model, plaintiffs are relieved from the difficulties of
claiming that a municipal body promulgated an unconstitutional policy (quasilegislative model). Likewise, plaintiffs need not seek the locus of formal
authority somewhere within the Byzantium of city bureaucracy (official action
model). Instead, to state a claim under the "failure to [blank]" model, plaintiffs
represents a substantial risk of having persons arrested on invalid warrants."); Loggins v.
Jeans, 841 F. Supp. 1174, 1177 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff may
establish municipal liability by showing that the municipality failed to stop or correct
repeated unconstitutional conduct by police officers).
106
See, e.g., Lowe v. City of St. Louis, 843 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing a
"progressive discipline policy" employed in dealing with misbehavior by police officers);
Baker v. McCoy, 739 F.2d 381 , 384 (8th Cir. 1984) ("This court has recognized that a local
government entity may be amenable to suit under § 1983 for a continuing failure to remedy
a known pattern of constitutionally offensive conduct by its subordinates.").
107
In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the plaintiff claimed that her rights
under the Due Process Clause were violated when she was denied necessary medical care
while in police custody. She asserted a claim of municipal liability for this deprivation based
on a theory of "grossly inadequate training." The plaintiff presented evidence of a municipal
regulation which gave police shift commanders complete discretion in deciding whether
prisoners were in need of medical care. The plaintiff also presented evidence that such
commanders received no training or guidelines to assist them in making such
judgments. See id. at 382. The Court found that the municipality could be held liable under
§ 1983 for failing to train commanders in this area because such a failure manifested a
"deliberately indifferent" attitude towards plaintiff's rights. Id. at 390; see also Board of
Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (rejecting a § 1983 municipal
liability claim based on a "failure to properly screen potential applicants") ; see also infra
notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
ws Harris , 489 U.S. at 390.
109
See id.
[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the
need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result
in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably
be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the failure to
provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is
responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury.
Id.
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may simply point to a municipal omission, such as the failure of municipal
government to provide adequate training and services to its employees and
constituency. 110 It is no wonder, then, that the "failure to [blank]" model has
become the most attractive vehicle for municipal liability among civil rights
lawyers. 111
Popularity has its price. The federal case reporters are awash with dubious
claims of municipal liability grounded in the "failure to [blank]" model. 112

I IO It is interesting to note that in Monell, decided more than twenty years prior to Harris,
the Court had determined that local governments not be held liable under§ 1983 simply for
their failure to act: "[W]e would appear to have decided that the mere right to control
without any control or direction having been exercised and without any failure to supervise
is not enough to support§ 1983 liability." See Monell v. Department of Social Services of
the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
( 1976)). The Harris Court did not refer to this earlier passage.
111
See Taylor, supra note 79, at 452 (noting that, among civil rights lawyers, "[t]he most
popular policy [under§ 1983] quickly became one that was defined as encouraging the use
of deadly or excessive force by one or more of the matrix of municipal failures-failure to
properly hire, train, discipline, supervise, control or investigate.").
112
See, e.g., Manarite v. Springfield, 957 F.2d 953,960 (1st Cir. 1992) (affirming a grant
of summary judgment to the defendant in a claim by the estate of a jail suicide victim where
a deliberately indifferent policy of allowing suicide could not be established in light of the
fact that the city had, four years prior to incident, promulgated state-approved guidelines for
supervision of suicide risks and intoxicated arrestees. The guidelines, for example, made
failure to _remove shoelaces of a public intoxication arrestee who exhibited no suicidal
behavior at most negligent) ; Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir.
1985) (affirming the dismissal of§ 1983 action brought by an arrestee against a city and its
police commissioner because plaintiff was unable to show facts to support the allegation
that the city failed to adequately train, discipline, and supervise its police officers. The court
properly rejected the plaintiffs assertion that he should be given the opportunity to conduct
limited discovery since the defendants were in sole possession of knowledge about police
department policies, because even the most minimal training (if any is necessary) obviously
is sufficient to inform a police officer that a beating such as that alleged by the arrestee is
impermissible); Martinez Correa v. Lopez Feliciano, 759 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D. P.R. 1991)
(reversing a jury verdict against a municipality for failure to train where plaintiff failed to
present evidence showing that the municipality's failure to train proximately caused his
injury, or that the municipality had a regular practice of hiring unqualified officers); Elliott
v. Cheshire County, 750 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (D.N.H 1990) (finding that supervisory
officials and the city were not liable for arrestee's jail suicide where the jail had
implemented a suicide prevention training program after prior suicides, and where nothing
in arrestee's behavior suggested need for greater care); Roman Figueroa v. Torres Molina,
754 F. Supp. 239, 244 (D.P.R. 1990) (finding that the police superintendent and city could
not be held liable for alleged use of excessive force by an officer who arrested a minor for
traffic violations. Implementation and development of extensive training programs,
designed to raise professionalism and accountability of line officers, negated any inference
of causal relationship between official department policy and alleged unconstitutional use of
force); Whitley v. New York, 518 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that
plaintiff, who had been shot by a police officer during the course of an armed robbery, had
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Tempted by the promise of Harris, § 1983 plaintiffs now almost automatically
assert that the constitutional deprivation they suffered at the hands of a law
enforcement officer resulted from the municipality's failure to train, transfer,
or otherwise supervise that officer. Judges share the blame for this explosion
of claims based on the "failure to [blank]" model. As they perceive recurring
constitutional violations perpetrated by the local officers in their communities,
district judges understandably adopt the view that the municipality ought to
bear liability under · Monell. This position is not necessarily erroneous.
However, having come to this view, the courts are afforded precious few boxes
into which they may attempt to fit the case before them. It is inevitable, then,
that the "failure to [blank]" model has become the receptacle of choice. For all
its apparent breadth and elasticity, however, this model is riddled with
problems.
The first problem with the "failure to [blank]" model is that, too often, it
simply does not fit the plaintiffs underlying complaint. With the vast majority
of constitutional wrongs, it is simply not true that additional training (or other
measures, such as improved hiring or supervision practices) would have
prevented the injury. This problem is evidenced by Walker v. City of New
York: the plaintiff, who spent nineteen years in prison for a crime he did not
commit, claimed the police department had shown deliberate indifference to
his rights by failing to supervise and train officers "not to commit perjury or
aid in the prosecution of the innocent." 113 The plaintiff argued that the duty to
train against committing perjury was analogous to the duty to train in the use
of deadly force, such that "city policymakers know to a moral certainty that
police officers will be presented with opportunities to commit perjury or
proceed against the innocent. . . [and that] a failure ... to resist these
opportunities will almost certainly result" in injuries to citizens. 114
The Court of Appeals correctly rejected this claim, noting that plaintiffs
argument had "misse[d] a crucial step." The "failure to [blank]" model
requires a likelihood that the failure to train or supervise will result in the
officer making the wrong decision. Here, however, "the proper response is
obvious to all without training or supervision," and the failure to train or
supervise is generally not "so likely" to produce a wrong decision as to support
an inference of deliberate indifference by city policymakers. 115
failed to show that he suffered a constitutional tort due to the city's alleged inadequate
training of the officer in the use of firearms).
11 3
974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 972 (1993).
114 Id.
115
See id. at 299-300. The plaintiff in Walker was successful, however, in stating a claim
for municipal liability based on "a complete failure by the [District Attorney] in 1971 to
train [Assistant District Attorneys] on fulfilling Brady obligations .... " Id. at 300. To the
court's mind, the Brady standard was not "so obvious or easy to apply as to require [no
training.]" Id.; see also Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998). The Barney
court noted:
Even if the [city's] courses concerning gender issues and inmates' rights were less than
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The second problem with the "failure to [blank]" model is that it focuses on
the promulgation of municipal policies concerning officer training,
supervision, discipline and related matters, while ignoring the manner in which
those policies are, or are not, implemented. Courts faced with municipal
liability claims based on the "failure to [blank]" model must look first at
whether the city had a training program, supervisory structure or disciplinary
regime. Then the court can determine whether these were sufficiently deficient
to meet the standard of deliberate indifference. Often, the mere existence of
such programs and structures ends the inquiry, on the assumption that if a
municipality has already instituted such programs, deliberate indifference to
the need to institute such programs cannot be shown.
This problem is exemplified by the recent Eighth Circuit decision in Liebe v.
Norton. 116 There, the wife of a detainee who committed suicide in a holding
cell brought a § 1983 suit against the county alleging a failure to supervise its
jailers. The court found that the county had instituted policies intended to
prevent inmate suicides, and that "[t]he existence of these policies indicate that
the County was interested in preventing inmate suicides and, in fact, took
affirmative steps to prevent such suicides." 117 Though not squarely addressing
the failure to supervise claim, the court noted that "the County's policy cannot
be both an effort to prevent suicides and, at the same time, deliberately
indifferent to suicides." II8 In other words, there can be no failure to supervise
where existing policies and procedures are in place. As with the "official
action" model of policy, the assumption here is that policies promulgated by
high-level officials are carried out perfectly by low-level officials. This
assumption renders the "failure to [blank]" model incapable of capturing much
of the constitutional misconduct of low-level officials, as courts seem
unwilling or unable to probe more deeply into the ways in which municipal
policies are actually carried out.
adequate, we are not persuaded that a plainly obvious consequence of a deficient
training program would be the sexual assault of inmates. Specific or extensive training
hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is
inappropriate behavior.
Id. at 1308; Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 (I Ith Cir. 1998). Similarly, the Floyd court
opined:
Applying the reasoning of Sewell and Walker to the facts of this case, we conclude that
the BOE [Board of Public Education] did not act with deliberate indifference to the
training and supervision of the security department. [The offending officer's]
conduct .. . [was] clearly against the basic norms of human conduct . .. [and] the BOE
was entitled to rely on the common sense of its employees not to engage in wicked and
criminal conduct.
Id. at 796; Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 490 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying
Walker's reasoning to reject plaintiff's claim that an officer's sexual molestation of an
arrestee resulted from municipality's deliberate indifference in training and supervision).
116
157 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998).
11 7
Id. at 579.
11s Id.
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A third problem with the "failure to [blank]" model lies in the difficulty of
establishing a causal link between the deficient training, supervision or
disciplinary program and the plaintiffs injury; Recently, a closely-divided
Supreme Court clarified the causation requirement in § 1983 "failure to
[blank]" cases. In Board of Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, the
plaintiff was injured after a high-speed chase when a deputy, Bums, physically
pulled her from a vehicle. 119 She brought suit against the County for the use of
excessive force, based upon the Sheriffs decision to hire Bums without
adequately investigating his background. 120
The issue before the Court was whether Bryan County could be held liable
for the Sheriffs decision to hire Bums. 121 In ruling for the County, the Court
reiterated the prohibition against vicarious municipal liability under § 1983,
noting that "rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to
ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its
employee." 122 The Court held that the Sheriffs " inadequate screening" of
Bums could only be deemed to have caused the plaintiffs injury if her injury
was a "plainly obvious consequence" of the hiring decision. Writing for the
majority, Justice O'Connor explained that any holding that the "inadequate
hiring ... policy directly caused the [p]laintiff s injury ... must depend on a
finding that this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury
suffered by the plaintiff." 123

119
See Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 399400 (1997).
120
Specifically, Brown claimed that Reserve Deputy Burns had a long record of driving
infractions, as well as a record of assault and battery, resisting arrest, and public
drunkenness. The Sheriff stated at trial that, although he had obtained Burns' record from
the National Crime Information Center, he did not carefully review it. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff, which was subsequently upheld by the Fifth Circuit, and the County
appealed to the Supreme Court. See id. at 40 l.
121
The Justices' questions during oral argument revealed their concern with the issue of
causation, or more specifically, whether municipal liability attaches where the claimed
injury has resulted from a chain of events started by the single lawful act of hiring an
employee. See 1996 WL 65602, at *7 (U.S. Oral Arg., Nov. 5, 1996) (95-1100). Members
of the Court repeatedly questioned the attorneys about whether the jury could have based
liability against the county on a finding of only "but for" causation, and one member of the
Court pointed out that even if the jury found a single act of deliberate indifference on the
part of a municipal policymaker, it had not been asked to decide whether that single act had
actually caused the plaintiff's injuries. See id., 1996 WL 65602, at *14, *30.
122
Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. The majority rejected Brown's contention that establishing
an act by a proper municipal decisionmaker alone imposes municipal liability. The Court
cautioned that, in such a situation, a jury may readily rely on the impermissible theory of
respondeat superior while the plaintiff has failed to prove any fault on the part of the
municipality. See id. at 410.
123
Id. at 412.
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Whatever other concerns might have motivated this ruling, 124 it appears that
plaintiffs bringing a "failure to [blank]" claim must now establish that their
injury was a "plainly obvious consequence" of the municipal action sufficient
to "demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights." 125 This is a difficult standard, essentially
requiring a plaintiff to prove that in an alternative universe, with perfect hiring
or training procedures, no constitutional injury would have resulted.
D.

The Problems With "Policy"

Through its three articulations of "policy"-the "quasi-legislative," "official
action," and "failure to [blank]" models-the Supreme Court has demonstrated
a thorough misunderstanding of municipal governance and municipal harm. In
the Court's view, municipalities govern, provide services and regulate lowlevel officials through a traditional pyramidal model, where carefully
articulated policies flow straight down from the top to the bottom. 126 This
idealized view of municipal bureaucracy, however, distorts or ignores the
124

Brown was decided 5-4. Interestingly, the same 5-4 division has been present in some
of the Court's recent federalism decisions. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
902 (1997) (Brady handgun legislation held unconstitutional); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 266 (1997) (Eleventh Amendment bars claim against State to quiet title
to lands); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (Commerce Clause
does not give Congress power to override Eleventh Amendment); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (Federal school gun possession statute beyond Congress'
commerce power). Because Brown can be read as a refusal to allow federal courts to
second-guess local hiring decisions, it seems appropriate to consider this case alongside
these federalism decisions. See Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983
with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 81 (1989) (arguing that the
Court frequently adverts to federalism concerns in the context of§ 1983 cases).
125
Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor noted the novelty of Ms.
Brown's claim that her injuries were caused by the sheriff's hiring decision:
A lack of scrutiny may increase the likelihood that an unfit officer will be hired, and
that the unfit officer will, when placed in a particular position to affect the rights of
citizens, act improperly. But that is only a generalized showing of risk. The fact that
inadequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would make a violation of rights
more likely cannot alone give rise to an inference that a policymaker's failure to
scrutinize the record of a particular applicant produced a specific constitutional
violation. After all, a full screening of an applicant's background might reveal no cause
for concern at all; if so, a hiring official who failed to scrutinize the applicant's
background cannot be said to have consciously disregarded an obvious risk that the
officer would subsequently inflict a particular constitutional injury.
Id. at410-ll.
126
Applying organization theory to the Court's§ 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence,
Professor Schuck has noted that the pyramid model assumes that "formal legal authority to
make policy on the agency's behalf is located at the top of the agency pyramid. That
authority is deployed by officials at or near the top to develop and to issue to the officials
located further down toward the base those implementing directives that will conform their
behavior to the agreed-upon policies." Schuck, supra note 78, at 1777.
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significance of "street-level" officials. 127 Section 1983 claims are typically
directed against police officers, school teachers, social workers and others.
These "street-level" officials, in providing direct municipal services to citizens,
possess broad autonomy and discretion, and their actions may not conform to
the Court's pyramidal model of municipal policymaking. 128
This idealized view of municipal governance, therefore, has led the Court to
adopt a restrictive view of municipal harm. The Court has thus far only based
municipal liability on "policy," in its various forms, and local governments are
not held responsible for pervasive harms caused by rank-and-file officers.
Injuries caused by the police code of silence, use of excessive force, racial
profiling, and other constitutional misconduct continue to occur, with few
cities ever held liable for these violations.
In sum, the three existing models of "official policy" cannot adequately and
honestly accommodate most claims of constitutional injury by low-level
officials. Again, the concern lies not with the formal categorization schemata
employed by lawyers and judges. Rather, it is that the mischaracterization of
claims as "policy" has deleterious consequences. For example, potentially
meritorious claims which fail to fit recognized "policy" models are often
dismissed at the pleading stage, or on summary judgment. 129 As I will show in
the next sections, where recurring constitutional abuses are more accurately
characterized as municipal "customs," the broad goals of § 1983 may be better
achieved.
Ill. THE LOST "CUSTOM" LANGUAGE OF§ 1983

The text of § 1983 creates liability for actions taken in accordance with "any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" that result in the deprivation
of constitutional rights or privileges (emphasis added). 130 In Monell, the
Supreme Court recognized that unconstitutional governmental "custom," even
where it "has not received formal approval through the body's decisionmaking

127

This term is borrowed from political scientist, Michael Lipsky.

See generally

MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: THE DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN

(1980).
As Professor Schuck has noted, "the behavior of low-level officials in street-level
agencies is significantly shaped by their operating routines, situation-specific social and
emotional needs, peer subculture norms and ideologies, and the dynamics and economy of
their daily interactions with the public." See Schuck, supra note 78, at 1778.
129
See supra note 112, and accompanying text. I do not argue that all § 1983 plaintiffs
would succeed on the merits in the absence of the "policy" requirement; some number of
baseless suits are filed annually. Rather, I argue that the various formulations of "policy"
generally fail to address claims involving pervasive constitutional misconduct by low-level
law enforcement officers. As a consequence, valid § 1983 claims based on such pervasive
harms do not survive.
130 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
PUBLIC SERVICES
128
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channels," 131 provides a basis, other than "policy" for municipal liability under
the statute. According to the Court, "customs" include well-settled practices of
government officials that are "not authorized by written law." 132 Since this
generalized pronouncement, however, the Court has all but forgotten "custom"
as a separate basis for municipal liability. 133 Indeed, in the post-Monell era,
the Supreme Court has not directly addressed a single § 1983 case alleging
injury by an unconstitutional municipal "custom." 134
Why has the Court ignored the "custom" language in the text of § 1983,
while expending great effort to define the judicially-created concept of
"policy," which appears nowhere in the statute? 135 One answer may be that the
Court views the statute as merely instructive, not conclusive. The Court has
characterized § 1983 as "loosely and blindly drafted," perhaps signaling that
the Justices view themselves as better qualified to determine the statute's
meaning. 136 Another answer may lie in the Court's insistence on a strong
causal connection between municipal action (or inaction) and .constitutional
injury. To the Justices, perhaps, a claim based on a municipal "custom" is too

131

Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,691
n.56 (1978) (" It would be a narrow conception of jurisprudence to confine the notion of
'laws' to what is found written on the statute books, and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon it. Settled state practice ... can establish what is state law.") (quoting
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940)).
132
Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)).
133
While the Court has noted that custom remains a distinct basis for municipal liability
under Monell, it has apparently had no occasion to discuss a claim for municipal liability
alleging an unconstitutional custom. See, e.g., City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378
(1989):
[l]n addition to suggesting that the city's failure to train its officers amounted to a
' policy' that resulted in the denial of medical care to detainees, respondent also
contended the city had a 'custom' of denying medical care .. . [but] this claim of an
unconstitutional 'custom' appears to be little more than a restatement of her 'failure-totrain as policy' claim ... [thus] we decline to determine whether respondent's
contention that such a 'custom' existed is an alternative ground for affirrnance.
Id. at 386 n.5.
134
See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1386 n.6 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he [Supreme]
Court recognizes 'municipal policy' in the judicially developed sense and 'custom or usage'
in the statutory sense as different legal concepts . . . though the Court has not since Monell
had the occasion to discuss 'custom or usage' in the. detail it has discussed 'policy. "').
135
As Professor Schuck has noted, "at its birth, the doctrine [of "official policy"] bore
the unmistakable imprint of bastardy; its supporting rationale suggests nothing so much as a
split-the-difference judicial compromise, a quid pro quo in which the swing Justices agreed
to Monell 's first prong, which overruled Monroe v. Pape, in exchange for a second prong
rejecting respondeat superior liability in favor of an 'official policy' requirement." See
Schuck, supra note 78, at 1755 n.13; see also Schnapper, supra note 16, at 215-16 (noting
that the "official policy" requirement announced in Monell had not even been raised, much
less briefed, in the Supreme Court and had not been discussed by the courts below).
136
See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 121 (1951).
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flimsy to sustain this causation requirement. 137 · A third possibility is that the
Court, which has relied heavily on the legislative history of § 1983 in
determining the scope of the statute, has been stymied by the elusive meaning
of "custom" in the legislative debates. 138 More likely, the Court's neglect of
the statutory "custom" language lies in historical accident. Having decided
Monell, a case in which the existence of an unconstitutional "policy" seemed
so clear, the Court was set upon the path of defining the various shades of
"policy." In the words of Justice Breyer, the Court has been "spin[ning] ever
finer distinctions as we try to apply Monell's basic distinction between liability
that rests upon policy and liability that is vicarious .... " 139
Whatever the reason, the "custom" language of § 1983 has indeed been lost,
and the very evils that it was designed to address-the unwritten codes of
conduct that permeated local officialdom-are precisely the evils that are least
accommodated by post-Monell bases for imposition of municipal liability. The
irony is compounded by the fact that unwritten codes of conduct among rank.and-file officers, far from having receded in the 127 years since the passage of
the statute, are far and away the most pervasive force causing the deprivation
of constitutional rights on the local level.
Fittingly, a very old problem will find a very old solution if the statutory
reference to "custom," which the drafters aimed at the unwritten codes of their
time, retains its vitality today when pointed at the codes of conduct observed
by contemporary local officials. I think it does.
A.

Historical Context and Early Federal Civil Rights Legislation

Prior to the Civil War, the United States Constitution protected civil rights
only against infringement by the federal government.
The first ten
amendments did not provide protection from the acts of individuals or state or
local governments, reflecting the Framers' fears of a powerful central
government, as well as their reliance on the states as guardians of individual
liberties. 140
The Reconstruction period following the Civil War 141 saw the emergence of

137
Though I will show in Part IV, infra, that certain unconstitutional "customs" more
than meet the legal requirements of causation.
138
See Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of" What law: A Reconstructed Model of Section
1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499,578 (1985) (noting that while the proper interpretation
of the statutory language of "any statute, ordinance [or] regulation" is "fairly
straightforward," "the meaning of 'custom or usage' is somewhat elusive"). See also infra
notes 175-86 and accompanying text.
139
Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430
(1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961)
("[W]hilst all authority in [the federal government] will be derived from and dependent on
the society, the society itself will be broken into . . . many parts.").
141
In the spring of 1865, while Congress was in recess, the Confederate army conceded
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a strong national government with the power to declare and protect the rights
of its citizenry. 142 In large part, the increasing strength and presence of the
national government was necessary in the face of continuing southern
resistance to the ideals for which the Civil War had been fought. 143
A primary example of southern intransigence during the postbellum period
was the adoption of "Black Codes" and other legislation, 144 which in large

victory to the North. President Johnson initiated Reconstruction by appointing provisional
governors in the fallen states. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 276 ( 1988).
142
See ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 36
( 1947) (The Civil War Amendments "gave Congress express power to provide federal
protection for various rights.").
143
James B. Browning, The North Carolina Black Code, 15 J. NEGRO HIST. 461, 471
(1930), reprinted in AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERJENCE, VOL. 2: EMANCIPATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 103 (Paul Finkelman, ed., 1992). See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 603 (1865) (stating that while it may be true that "the black codes fell with slavery,"
Southern statutes made the freedman "an outcast, industrially a serf, legally a separate and
oppressed class").
144
The Black Codes, enacted by a number of southern states in 1865 and 1866, sought to
keep blacks in an inferior class by disabling them from freely seeking work, having access
to the courts as a means of redressing wrongs, obtaining land, or bearing arms. See
generally Aremona G. Bennett, Phantom Freedom: Official Acceptance of Violence to
Personal Security and Subversion of Proprietary Rights and Ambitions Following
Emancipation, 1865-1910, 70 CHJ.-KENT L. REv. 439, 445-47, 453-55 (1994) (describing
judicial decisions and Black Code provisions which denied southern blacks protection of
occupational liberty and the right to contract). South Carolina and Florida, for example,
passed laws forbidding blacks to migrate into or out of the state without posting bond. See
W.E.B. Du BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 167-68 (1962). The Mississippi
Black Code provided that adult blacks without employment, blacks "unlawfully assembling
together," and white persons associated with blacks would be guilty of vagrancy and subject
to a fifty dollar fine and ten days imprisonment if black, and two hundred dollars and six
months imprisonment if white. See David F. Forte, Spiritual Equality, The Black Codes and
the Americanization of the Freedmen, 43 LOY. L. REv. 569 (1998); City of Chicago v.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 n.20 (1999) (noting that "vagrancy laws were used after the
Civil War to keep former slaves in a state of quasi slavery"). In North Carolina, blacks were
forced to sign contracts that incorporated onerous provisions mandating labor from sun-up
to sundown, banning entertainment on the plantation, and enjoining blacks from leaving the
plantation without permission of the master. See Browning, supra note 143, at 471.
Louisiana, whose 1866 code was one of the most severe, authorized fines for
"disobedience," which included "[flailing to obey reasonable orders," "impudence,"
"swearing," and "indecent language to or in the presence of the employer, his family or
agent." Id. Blacks were also forbidden from serving on juries, testifying or acting as parties
against whites, see KENNETH STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1965), or
carrying firearms without licenses, see Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The
Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309. 34445 (1991); see also DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL, MILITARY,
SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, EDUCATIONAL, AND INDUSTRIAL, 1865-1906 289 (Walter L. Fleming
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measure re-enslaved the freedmen and threatened to undermine the tenets of
the Thirteenth Amendment. 145
Northern Republicans, outraged by these acts and alarmed at a resurgent
Democratic party in the South, responded by enacting what became known as
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 146 over President Johnson's veto. In many
respects, the legislative history of modem civil rights begins with the 1866
Act, which served as a textual model for both § 1983 and the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 147
Intended to combat the Black Codes, 148 § 1 of the 1866 Act gave broad
protection to freedmen as citizens, guaranteeing "full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by

ed., 1966) (describing the Mississippi Black Code provision that "no freedman, free Negro
or mulatto, not in the military service of the United States government, and not licensed so
to do by the board of police of his or her county, shall keep or carry fire-arms of any kind . .

. .").
145

As one commentator has noted, the Black Codes "were an attempt to restrict the
Negro's labor and movements in such a way as to continue his economic dependence on the
former master class, and to deprive him of the political rights by which he might enlarge his
freedom of choice in economic life." MORROE BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE: THE
REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS 4-5 (1968). See also Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History
of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1325 (1952) (explaining that the Black
Codes' "restrictions ... resulted in forcing Negroes to work for their former masters or
other white men" and caused African Americans to remain slaves "in all but the
constitutional sense").
146
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31 , § 1, 14. Stat. 27 (1866).
147
Compare id. § 2 ("any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act") with Act of Apr.
20, 1871 , ch. 22, § l , 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983) ("every person who,
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State") and
with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
148
See, e.g., Remarks of Senator Trumbull introducing the bill:
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled in the
insurrectionary States have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in nearly all the
States they have discriminated against them. They deny them certain rights, subject
them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them the very restrictions which were
imposed upon them in consequence of the existence of slavery, and before it was
abolished. The purpose of the bill under consideration is to destroy all these
discriminations, and to carry into effect the [Thirteenth] amendment.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); see also
Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative
History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987, 992-95 (noting that the Black Codes set the
stage for Congressional action).
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white citizens." 149 Section 2 of the 1866 Act, the direct precursor to § 1983,
provided that:
any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, shall subject or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State
or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this
act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such
person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude . . . or by reason of his color or race . . . shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. 150
All persons, including local officials, who deprived a citizen of civil rights
under this statute could be fined or imprisoned. 151 The bill further authorized
federal district attorneys, marshals and agents of the Freedmen's Bureau to
bring suit against violators in the federal courts. 152
The language of these two sections manifests the dual Congressional goals
of securing certain rights for all citizens (Section l) and punishing the
deprivation of those rights taken "under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation or custom" (Section 2). While Section 2 met with little debate,
Senator Trumbull's remarks make clear that the Act was intended to deter
constitutional violations-whether in the form of discriminatory state laws
such as the Black Codes or discriminatory actions such as the unequal
enforcement of laws: "When it comes to be understood in all parts of the
United States that any person who shall deprive another of any right or subject
him to any punishment in consequence of his color or race will expose himself
to fine and imprisonment, I think such acts will soon cease." 153
As a direct predecessor of§ 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reveals the
postbellum Congresses' understanding that pervasive practices by local law
enforcement threatened to undermine the ideals of equality and citizenship
inherent in the Thirteenth Amendment. When many of the 1866 Act's
provisions were later codified in the Fourteenth Amendment, 154 it became

149
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31 , § I, 14 Stat. 27 ( 1866). This provision of the
1866 Act overruled Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,407 (1857), which had
held that descendants of those brought to the United States as slaves were not citizens and
had "no rights which the white man was bound to respect."
150 Id.§ 2.

151
152
153

See id.; see also, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 319 (1866).
See ch. 31 §2, 14 Stat. 27.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).
Congress presented the 14th Amendment for ratification in the fall of 1866. White
southerners, however, refused to ratify: with the exception of Tennessee, every southern
state between the last months of 1866 and the first months of 1867 rejected the Fourteenth
Amendment. See generally James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the 14th
Amendment, 23 AKRON L. REv. 18 (1985). In March 1867, Congress retaliated against the
South 's defiant refusal to accept the 14th Amendment by imposing military Reconstruction.
The South was divided into five military districts and new criteria were promulgated for
154
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increasingly clear that federal enforcement of these rights against incursion by
local officials was necessary. Congress then began to enforce "by appropriate
legislation," the rights guaranteed by the Reconstruction Amendments. 155 The
aptly-named Enforcement Acts-of which § 1983 is one-were a series of
statutes intended to give bite to violations of the rights guaranteed by the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments. 156
B.

The Ku Klux Klan Act of I 871

The federal government's legislative struggle to realize the constitutional
ideals of freedom and equality had little impact on daily life in the South. 157
Reports from Freedmen's Bureau 158 agents stationed throughout the South
restoration, including, of course, ratification of the 14th Amendment. In addition, Congress
required constitutional conventions be held in every southern state to draft new constitutions
that would be approved by voters and Congress; black males over the age of 21 be added to
voter rolls and certain classes of white voters removed; and that elections for state offices
occur only after the new constitutions had been approved and adopted. See Reconstruction
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428 (1867); Reconstruction Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch.
6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867); see generally FONER, supra note 141, at 276. By July 28, 1868, two
years after the commencement of military Reconstruction, all newly "reconstructed"
southern governments had ratified the 14th Amendment. The 15th Amendment, which
guaranteed that the right to vote would not be withheld on the basis of "race, color or
previous condition of servitude," was ratified in March, 1870. Id.
155
See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 5 ("Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
156
The fust Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. L. 140) (1870), "a criminal code
upon the subject of elections," forbade state officials to discriminate among voters on the
basis of race and authorized the President to appoint election supervisors with the power to
bring to federal court cases of election fraud, the bribery or intimidation of voters, and
conspiracies to prevent citizens from exercising their constitutional rights. CONG. GLOBE.,
41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3656 (1870). A second act strengthened enforcement powers in large
cities. See id. The Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871 is sometimes called the "third force
bill." Id. See also infra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
157
As Michael Gerhardt noted:
[The Civil War Amendments] could not end the increasing violence occurring
primarily in the South against the newly freed slaves and their supporters. This
violence was perpetrated both by individuals and by organized groups such as the Ku
Klux Klan, which included members that were state and local officials. State officers,
including state judges, contributed to the violence by participating in it themselves or
by not punishing the perpetrators when given the opportunity.
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal
Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 539, 547 (1989); see also Gene R.
Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REv. 959, 975 (1987)
(observing that local courts were "unable or unwilling to check the evil").
158
Established by Congress in March 1865, the original purpose of the Freedmen's
Bureau was to distribute clothing, food, and fuel to destitute freedmen and to oversee "all
subjects" relating to their condition in the South. The Bureau was intended as a temporary
expedient, with a one year life span and no budget of its own. Given the chaotic conditions
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recounted terrifying episodes of violence against the freedmen and white
sympathizers by the Ku Klux Klan 159 and other paramilitary groups. Raciallymotivated beatings, lynchings and murders were common in the South during
this period. 160
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of these reports was that local authorities
either did nothing to protect the freedmen or actively participated in the
assaults. 161 Sheriffs refused to investigate or arrest whites suspected of crimes

in the postwar South, Bureau agents "spent most of their time coping with day-to-day crises,
and did so under adverse circumstances and with resources unequal to the task." FONER,
supra note 141, at 69, 143; see also GEORGE R. BENlLEY, A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN'S
BUREAU 110 (1974).
159
Established in 1866 by former members of the Confederate Army, the Ku Klux Klan
became a terrifying source of organized violence in the postbellum South. Often acting with
the support of local governments, the Klan focused its violence primarily on preventing
blacks from gaining political or economic equality, and secondarily on whites whose
sympathies were with the North. The Klan was undoubtedly responsible for numerous
outrages against the freedmen and white Republicans. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., I st
Sess., app. at 277 (1871) (speech of Rep. Porter); see generally STANLEY F. HORN,
INVISIBLEEMPIRE: THESTORYOFTHEKUKLUX.KLAN 1866-1871 (1973).
160
A Bureau agent in Tennessee reported that between April 1865 and October 1866,
thirty-three freedmen had been murdered by whites.
Letter from J.R. Lewis to
Commissioner Howard (Oct. 3, 1866), quoted in John A. Carpenter, Atrocities in the
Reconstruction Period, in LYNCHING, RACIAL VIOLENCE, AND Law 36, 48 (Paul Finkelman
ed., 1992). Some Freedmen's Bureau reports also indicated the purported reason for a
particular assault on a freedman: "killed because he did not take off his hat to Murphy," or
"shot him as he was passing in the street to 'see him kick."' Letter from J.B. Kiddoo to
Commissioner Howard (Oct. 25, 1866), quoted in Carpenter, supra at 239. While most
freedmen lived in constant fear, blacks holding public office faced particular threat of
violence. At least one tenth of the black members of the 1867-68 constitutional conventions
became victims of violence during Reconstruction, including seven actually murdered.
Richard L. Hume, Negro Delegates to the State Constitutional Conventions of 1867-69, in
SOUTHERN BLACK LEADERS (Howard N. Rabinowitz, ed., 1982). White Republicans were
also persecuted by illicit groups. Klansmen murdered three "scalawag" members of the
Georgia legislature and drove ten others from their homes in 1868, assassinated a prominent
Republican leader in 1869, and organized nighttime gangs to sit watch outside the homes of
Republicans, threatening their lives if they did not desist in their political course. OTTO H.
OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION WINEGAR TOURGEE 160-64 (1965).
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1838 (1866):
The poor freedmen, who a few months ago were leaping and laughing with the joy of
newfound liberty, invoking the blessings of Heaven upon the Government that had
everywhere subject to indignity, insult, outrage and murder. During the past four
months, in Alabama alone, fourteen hundred cases. of assault upon freedmen have been
brought before the Freedmen's Bureau ... [T]he murders go unpunished.
Id., app. at 140 (statement of Sen. Wilson).
161
Letter from Davis Tillson, Assistant Commissioner, Georgia, to Commissioner
Howard (Feb. 24, 1866), quoted in Carpenter, supra note 160, at 238. Tillson reported that
he "called upon the Sheriff of Henry County and asked him to arrest certain parties charged
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against blacks, district attorneys refused to prosecute, and courts refused to
entertain civil cases brought by the freedmen against their white persecutors. 162
A Freedmen's Bureau agent stationed in Kentucky, for example, reported that
at least nineteen freedmen had been killed and 233 freedmen had been badly
injured from 1865 to 1866; in none of these cases had any action toward
punishing the offenders been reported by the state authorities. 163 An agent in
Louisiana reported seventy murders of freedmen by whites and 210 cases of
whipping, beating and stabbing. 164 Again, in almost every instance, the guilty
parties had not been apprehended. 165 As one Bureau agent in New Orleans
reported, most local officials were simply too prejudiced to grant the freedmen
equal justice: "whenever they can grind a poor Black man down, they do it to
gain popularity, 'as it is nothing but a cursed nigger,' (using their own
language)." 166
with committing outrages on freed people." Id. The sheriff replied that "it would be
unpopular to punish white men for anything done to a negro--it might be unsafe-that he
was not going to obey the orders of any damned Yankee-and that the rebellion was not
over in Henry County." Id. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin in the Nation Anew:
Congress, Citizenship and Civil Rights After the Civil War in THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE: EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, Vol. 3, 383 (Paul FinkJeman, ed.).
Kaczorowski notes that
local officials in the South sanctioned and legitimized the defiant behavior of
individuals, and the racial and political customs of communities dominated by
white[] ... state officers commonly failed or refused to protect the personal safety and
property of blacks ... [and when] Southern blacks and politically unpopular whites
were the victims of crimes, they ·could not get sheriffs to arrest, courts to try, or juries
to convict the perpetrators.
Id.
162 Letter from Major General Joseph B. Kiddoo, Assistant Commissioner, Texas, to
Commissioner Howard (June 26, 1866), quoted in Carpenter, supra note 160, at 239.
Kiddoo reported that he was unable to obtain justice for the freedmen from the civil courts;
trial of these cases, he said, was "worse than a farce." Id. The Assistant Commissioner of
South Carolina, Robert K. Scott, reported that "even under the most favorable circumstances
that can be anticipated under the present system of laws, the freed people will fail to receive
from the civil authorities that protection to which they are entitled both by right and by law,
and without which they cannot but' gradually revert back to a condition differing little from
their former slavery-save in name." Letter from R.K. Scott to Commissioner Howard
(Dec. 18, 1866), quoted in Carpenter, supra note 160, at 240.
163 Letter from General Jefferson C. Davis to Commissioner Howard (Nov. 27, 1866),
quoted in Carpenter, supra note 160, at 242 .
164 See Report of General Joseph A. Mower to Commissioner Howard (March 1867),
quoted in Carpenter, supra note 160, at 242. Mower's 30-page report contained detailed
information concerning the individual murders and the refusal of local authorities to
investigate and prosecute offenders. According to Mower, the civil authorities "took no
notice of the affair." Id.
165
See id.
166 Report of Lieutenant J.C. De Gress (June 24, I 867), quoted in Carpenter, supra note
160, at 242.
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Some state governments tried to stem the escalating violence in towns and
counties by, for example, outlawing travel in disguise, raising the penalties for
assault, murder, and conspiracy, and authorizing ordinary citizens to arrest
Klan members.167 Yet there was no real mechanism for enforcing these laws
because much Klan activity took place in Democratic counties, where local
officials either belonged to the organization or systematically refused to
enforce state criminal laws against members of the Ku Klux Klan and similar
groups. 168 Further, victims of this organized violence found themselves with
no recourse in the state courts. 169 While the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had
essentially repealed the Black Codes, it had not reached the more invidious and
destructive inaction of state and local governments in failing to protect the
rights of the citizenry. 170
In response to the growing violence, President Grant sent a inessage to
Congress bemoaning the "condition of affairs" in the South which rendered
"life and property insecure" and "urgently recommend[ing] . .. legislation as in
the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property,
and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States." 171 The
President's message, as well as testimony presented to the Joint Committee on

167

See F0NER, supra note 141, at 438.
When southern sheriffs did arrest suspects, "witnesses proved reluctant to testify,
KJansmen perjured themselves to provide one another with alibis, and, as one Florida
Republican leader observed, 'if any one of these [KJans]men is on the jury .. . you cannot
convict."' FONER, supra note 141, at 434. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he Klan
acted with the support of local governments in some areas, and in spite of the government in
other[s]." Mead, supra note 23, at 16, n.86; see also Developments in the Law, supra note
14, at 1153 ("Southern resistance to Reconstruction continued and by early 1871 there was
overwhelming evidence that through tacit complicity and deliberate inactivity, state and
local officials were fostering vigilante terrorism against politically active blacks and Union
sympathizers.").
169
See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., )st Sess. 244 (1871).
Of the hundreds of outrages committed upon loyal people through the agency of this
Ku Klux organization, not one has been punished . . . . [The laws] only fail in
efficiency when a man of known Union sentiments-whether black or white-invokes
their aid. Then Justice closes the door of her temples; frightful murders, whippings,
and robberies may occur where these are the subjects, and the arm of Justice is
paralyzed.
Id. (Speech of Sen. Pratt).
170
See WILLIAM s. MCFEELY, GRANT: A BIOGRAPHY 260 (1981) (noting that by 1867,
Freedman's Bureau Commissioner Oliver Otis Howard "had dozens of carefully
documented reports from his agents of murders and mutilations of freedmen all across the
South").
171
Message of March 23, 1871 , CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871); see
also Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 1153 & n. 106 ("[In response to a]trocities
committed by the Ku Klux Klan[,] ... President Grant requested emergency legislation in a
special message, stating that a virtual state of anarchy existed in the South and affirming that
the states were powerless to control the widespread violence.").
168
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Reconstruction, 172 convinced the Forty-Second Congress that political
authorities in the South would not only deny blacks their rights of citizenship,
but also would willingly participate in their violent victimization. 173 In
response, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, or the Ku Klux Klan
Act, on April 20, 1871. 174 Section 1 of Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
gave any person whose rights should have been protected and were not federal
cause of action against the official who should have provided the protection.
In the sparse legislative debates surrounding this section, 175 it was. clear that
Congress included the phrase "customs and usages" within its definition of law
in the original Act because of the persistent and widespread discriminatory
practices of state officials in some areas of the postbellum South. 176 Senator
Davis spoke of "custom and usage" in the context of the common practice of
giving whites superior public accommodations. 177 Senator Thurman argued
that the section referred to "either statute law or 'custom or usage,' which has
become common law." 178 Senator Trumbull referred to customs prevailing in
a particular community, using the example of the Southern practice of
providing harsher punishments for blacks than for whites in criminal cases. 179
And Representative Garfield stated, "even where the laws are just and equal on
their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or
refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal
protection under them." 180 Indeed, many of the bill's supporters argued that

172

S. REP. No. 42-1 (1871) (reporting investigations into Klan violence in the South
against blacks and white Republicans).
173
See EUGENE HOLLON, FRONTIER JUSTICE: ANOTHER LOOK 221-22 (1974) (stating that
the statistics submitted to Congress on the lawlessness and violence in the South "were
generally accepted as valid by both radical and conservative members").
174
See 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd
Cong., 1st Sess., 820 (1871); see also 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL
RIGHTS 591-93 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970) (summarizing the social and political
circumstances in which the 1871 Act was enacted).
175
See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 1155 (noting that Section 1 of
the 1871 Act "was the least controversial portion of the bill"); Note, Limiting the Section
1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486, 1488 n. 14 (1969)
("Section 1983's predecessor-a comparatively uncontested part of a highly controversial
bill-received little attention and no amendment.").
176
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1871) ("[T]he States made no
successful effort to bring the guilty to punishment or afford protection or redress .... ")
(remarks of Rep. Beatty); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., I st Sess., app. at 71 ( 1871) (statement
of Rep. Shellabarger).
177
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., app. at 183 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis).
178
See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., app. at 217 (1871) (statement of Sen.
Thurman).
179
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
18
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., app. at 153. (1871) (statement of Rep.
Garfield).

°
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the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not a mere
prohibition against discrimination, but a requirement of protective
enforcement. 181 In other words, a state or locality might violate equal
protection if it stood by and "permit[ted] the rights of citizens to be
systematically trampled," even where these violations occurred "without color
of law." 182 Therefore, it was not the unavailability of state remedies, but
rather, "the failure of certain states to enforce the laws with an equal hand that
furnished the powerful momentum" behind the Act. 183
Thus, "custom" in the statutory provision that is now § 1983 was directed at
the "persistent and widespread" practices of ordinary sheriffs and prosecutors
in failing to protect the rights of citizens. 184 Custom was not limited to the
direct actions of policymaking officials or the unconstitutional laws passed by
state and local governments. Rather, the very purpose of the "custom"
language in the statute was to target the actions of non-policymaking
government officials whose misconduct was tolerated by the policymakers. 185
And while the "custom" provision of § 1983 was not used effectively to
combat systemic problems of local law enforcement for nearly a hundred years
after its enactment, 186 rumblings of claims based on unconstitutional customs

181

It is clear from the debates on the Enforcement Act of I 871 that Congress knew that
law enforcement officials participated in lynchings and mob violence. See generally CONG.
GLOBE, 42nd Cong., !st Sess. (1871). One member described an incident in his district:
[S]uddenly, without provocation or warning, a policeman, or at least a man in the
uniform of a policeman, drew a pistol and deliberately put a bullet through the body of
a quiet and inoffensive colored man standing near him. Immediately, an indiscriminate
and rapid firing commenced. . . . For at least five minutes a steady fire was poured into
the retreating crowd. . . . . [T]he panic was increased by the discovery that the police
force was in full sympathy with the murderers, and were themselves emptying their
revolvers into the terrified and struggling mass of human beings who were frantically
striving to get beyond their range.
Id. at app. I 84 (statement of Rep. James Platt).
182
Id. at 375 (statement of Rep. Lowe).
183 Id.
184

The Supreme Court observed in Adickes that "Congress included customs and usages
within the definition of law in [§ 1983] because of the persistent and widespread
discriminatory practices of state officials." Adickes v. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S . 144, 167
(1970).
185
As the Court held in Monroe, § 1983 was enacted, in large part, to provide a federal
remedy where state law, "though adequate in theory," was unavailable in practice. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961). See also Schnapper, supra note 16, at 229
("The unconstitutional customs with which supporters of § 1983 were concerned were
not ... exercises of final or delegated authorities but the widespread and persistent practices
of ordinary sheriffs, judges and prosecutors.").
186
For example, local law enforcement officials condoned or even participated in
lynchings and other violence against blacks in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries with little fear of civil rights suits, or any other form of punishment for their
unconstitutional acts. See ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST
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can now be heard at the lower federal court level.
C.

Modem "Custom" Claims

Even though the Supreme Court has never directly addressed a claim
brought under the "custom" language of § 1983, it has acknowledged that
"Congress included customs and usages because of the persistent and
widespread discriminatory practices of state officials . . . . Although not
authorized by written law, such practices of state officials could well be so
permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force
of law." 187 Guided by this language, the lower federal courts have seen a
modest number of§ 1983 claims seeking to hook municipal liability squarely
on the existence of an unconstitutional "custom." Only a handful of these
courts have undertaken any analysis to distinguish "custom" from "policy." 188
LYNCHING, 1909-1950 8 (1980) (stating that "public officials .. . either cooperated with the
mob or sought refuge in silence and inaction"); U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 23 (1947) ("Punishment of lynchers is not accepted as the responsibility of state or
local governments .... Frequently, state officials participate in the crime, actively or
passively."); JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 24 (1993) (noting that police participated in at least half of the
lynchings in the 1930s); WE CHARGE GENOCIDE 10-12, 58, 59, 81, 82, 120, 225 (William L.
Patterson ed., 1951) (describing numerous cases of police participation in, and even
instigation of, mob attacks on African Americans up to the 1950s); Howard N. Rabinowitz,
The Conflict between Blacks and the Police in the Urban South, 1865-1900, HISTORIAN,
Nov. 1976, at 62, reprinted in RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 318, 324-26 (Paul Finkelman
ed., 1992) (recounting instances of police brutality against African Americans in post-Civil
War urban communities that were rarely punished). Many scholars analogize police
brutality and misconduct today to the lynchings of the past. See Abraham L. Davis, The
Rodney King Incident: Isolated Occurrence or a Continuation of a Brutal Past?, 10 HARV.
BLACKLETTER J. 67 (1993). For example, Judge Higginbotham described the Rodney King
beating as "a haunting sequel to the widespread lynching of blacks in the south." A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. & Aderson B. Francois, Looking for God and Racism in all the Wrong
Places, 10 DENY. U. L. REV. 191, 192 (1993).
187
Adickes, 398 U.S. at 167. The Court has also explained:
It would be a narrow conception of jurisprudence to confine the notion of 'laws' to
what is found written on the statute books, and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon it. Settled state practice ... can establish what is state law . . . . Deeply
embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy ... are often tougher and truer
law than the dead words of the written text.
Id. at 168 (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369
( 1940) (noting the petitioner claimed that "all the organs of the state are conforming to a
practice, systematic, unbroken for more than forty years")). It should be noted, however,
both Adickes and Browning were decided prior to Monell's extension of§ 1983 liability to
municipal entities.
188
For example, the Ninth Circuit aptly described the purpose of municipal liability for
unconstitutional customs as follows :
The existence of custom as a basis for liability under § 1983 thus serves the critical role
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A number of custom claims have been brought by municipal employees
alleging discriminatory "customs" that cost them their jobs. For example, a
Mexican-American city employee prevailed in a § 1983 action against his
municipal employer by showing evidence of a pattern of disparate treatment
over a period of several years that was "both instigated and ratified by ...
subordinate supervisory personnel," culminating in plaintiff's dismissal from
his position. 189 The Eighth Circuit held that "[t]he evidence was sufficient for
the jury to conclude that the discrimination was so permanent and well-settled
as to constitute a custom with the force of law." 190
The "custom" basis for municipal liability has also been used effectively in
a handful of police-related § 1983 cases. For example, in Jones v. City of
Chicago, an African-American man wrongly charged with rape and murder
prevailed in a § 1983 suit against police officers, the department and the
City . 191 The plaintiff proved an unconstitutional custom in the maintenance of
"street files," i.e., police files containing contemporaneous notes of
investigations which are "withheld from the state's attorney and therefore
unavailable as a source of exculpatory information that might induce the D.A.
of insuring that local government entities are held responsible for widespread abuses or
practices that cannot be affirmatively attributed to the decisions or ratification of an
official government policymaker but are so pervasive as to have the force of law.
Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989). The court observed
that the "county maintained a 'custom' of unconstitutional jail conditions in the form of a
shortage of beds." Id. at 1449.
189
Garza v. City of Omaha, 814 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff introduced
evidence that his supervisors engaged in the practice of distributing paychecks to nonminorities at 9:30 a.m., but not paying minorities until day's end because they believed
minorities would leave after receiving their checks. See id. at 555. Plaintiff also showed
that defendants hired a non-minorities "right off the street" for full-time positions that
plaintiff, and other minorities, had been promised. Id. Finally, plaintiff proved that his
supervisor ordered him to sign a false statement that a black employee had beaten and
robbed a supervisor; apparently, plaintiffs false statement was necessary to "get rid of the
nigger." Id. Plaintiffs refusal to obey this command Jed to his suspension and eventual
dismissal.
190
Id.; see also Boben v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d 1180, l l 89 (7th Cir. 1986)
(finding the City liable where sexual harassment of female employees was an "on-going and
accepted practice at the East Chicago Fire Department," which constituted a custom for
purposes of municipal liability under§ 1983).
191
856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988). George Jones was wrongfully arrested, jailed, and
charged with murder and other crimes.
After these charges were dropped, Jones sued the City of Chicago and several Chicago
police officers and a police lab technician under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution,
as well as conspiracy to commit these wrongs. He alleged that the defendants' conduct
had denied him due process of Jaw under the Fourteenth Amendment and violated his
rights under the common law of Illinois. A jury awarded him $801,000 in
compensatory and punitive damages.
Id. at 988.
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not to prosecute or, failing that, would at least be available to defense counsel
under Brady." 192 Plaintiff further proved that the maintenance of street files
was a department-wide practice known to police department supervisors, and
that the "clandestine character of the street files" caused his injuries. 193
Similarly, in Mathias v. Bingley, the plaintiff brought a§ 1983 suit alleging
that the police department maintained an unlawful custom of failing to notify
individuals with claims to property seized in criminal investigations. 194
Observing that officers customarily attempted to notify lawful owners "once or
twice, maybe not at all," the court found the municipality liable under the
"custom" prong of§ 1983. 195
In these cases, plaintiffs pointed to the unwritten practices adhered to by
rank-and-file municipal officials as the basis for establishing municipal
liability . It is doubtful that these plaintiffs could have successfully argued that
the offending actions constituted municipal policies under any of the three
models discussed in Part II. In Garza v. City of Omaha, the court found "there
was evidence that the disparate treatment of which Garza complained took
place over a period of several years ... The evidence was sufficient for the
jury to conclude that the discrimination was so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a custom with the force of law." 196 The plaintiff would have been
unsuccessful under both the quasi-legislative model (because there was no
written, unconstitutional policy) and the official action model (because the
discriminatory acts involved subordinate personnel rather than final
policymakers).
An important question is whether Garza would have been successful
bringing a§ 1983 claim under the "failure to [blank]" model, asserting that the
city failed to train, supervise or discipline the low-level officials not to engage
in discriminatory actions. But there are three problems with such a claim.
First, the unconstitutionality of long-standing discriminatory actions is obvious
to all without training or supervision. Thus, in the words of the Second Circuit,
any "failure to train or supervise is generally not 'so likely' to produce a wrong
decision as to support an inference of deliberate indifference by city
policymakers to the need to train or supervise." 197 Second, the city had nondiscrimination policies in place when Garza and other Mexican-American
employees suffered under the actions of low-level officials. It is unlikely that a

192
Id. at 995 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring prosecution to
tum over any exculpatory evidence to the defense)). According to Judge Posner, the
maintenance of police street files reveals "a frightening abuse of power by members of the
Chicago police force and unlawful conduct by the City itself." Id. at 988.
193
Id. at 995.
194
Mathias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1990).
195
Id. at 1054.
196
Garza v. City of Omaha, 814 F.2d 553,556 (8th Cir. 1987).
197
Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d at 293, 299-300 (2d Cir. 1992); see also supra
notes 107-09, and accompanying text.
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court would have examined whether those policies rose to the level of
deliberate indifference. 198 Finally, the plaintiff would have difficulty showing
the required causal nexus between his injury and the alleged deficient training,
supervision, or failure to discipline. 199
Similar problems would have arisen in Jones v. City of Chicago, where the
police had a custom of maintaining "street files" containing exculpatory
evidence that were never released to the state attomey. 200 While Jones was able
to prove to the jury that this particular "custom" was "department-wide and of
long standing," it is unlikely he could have shown that the Department had a
written policy authorizing street files, or that an unwritten policy had been
authorized by a final policymaker.201 Jones also would not have prevailed
under a "failure to [blank]" theory, because the unconstitutionality of this
clandestine system should have been, "plainly obvious" to all police officers,
so any "failure to train" could not have caused the challenged deprivations.
The post-Monell "custom" cases provide a glimpse into the dormant power
of § 1983 to attack the unwritten codes of conduct that underlie official
misconduct. To appreciate the potency of the "custom" provision, it is
necessary to look beyond fringe police practices, such as the use of "street
files" in Jones v. City of Chicago. The unwritten codes of conduct addressed
by the 1871 statute find their modem day equivalent in a pervasive, unwritten
code adhered to by officials in contemporary law enforcement organizationsthe "police code of silence."
IV. THE "CUSTOM" OF THE POLICE CODE OF SILENCE

The police "code of silence" is a well-documented phenomenon. 202
198 See, e.g. , Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 579 (8th. Cir. 1998) (stating that a county's
policy "cannot be both an effort to prevent suicides and, at the same time, deliberately
indifferent to suicide"). See also supra text accompanying notes 116-18 (providing detailed
analysis of Liebe v. Norton).
199
See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (stating that, although
respondent has identified a deficiency in a police training program, she "must still prove that
the deficiency in training actually caused the police officers' indifference to her medical
needs"); Board of the County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 412
( 1997) ('The connection between the background of the [officer inadequately screened] and
the specific constitutional violation alleged must be strong."). See also supra notes 120-25
and accompanying text (providing analysis of Brown under "failure to screen applicants"
model).
200
See Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 989 (7th. Cir. 1988).
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Joel Berger, See-No-Evil Officers Should Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997,
at A 13 (noting documentation of New York Police Department's failure to "adequately
punish officers who blatantly lied to protect other officers charged with brutality); Jeff
Gammage, Code of Silence: A Barrier to Truth in Investigations of Police, PHILA.
INQUIRER, May 5, 1996, at El (citing examples where police officers refused to report the
criminal behavior of other officers); Jose Martinez, .'Blue Wall' Stymies Cop-Beating Probe;
'Blue Wall' of Silence Thwarts Probe Into Cox Beating, Bos. HERALD, Jan. 28, 2000, at
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Generally, the code of silence refers to the refusal of a police officer to "rat" on
fellow officers, even if the officer has knowledge of wrongdoing or
misconduct. The code of silence has existed, to varying degrees, for as long as
there have been organized police forces 203-from the New York Police under
the notoriously corrupt Boss Tweed gang of the 1840s,204 to the wave of

Al (citing U.S . Attorney's explanation that a "sustained code of Silence" among Boston
police thwarted investigation into police beating of a black fellow officer and outlasted the
statute of limitations for bringing federal charges); Joseph D. McNamara, Has the Drug War
Created an Officer Liars' Club ?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at Ml (noting recent perjury
scandals in police pepartments in Los Angeles, Boston, New Orleans, San Francisco,
Denver, New York, and other large U.S . cities); Joyce Pumick, The Blue Line Between Rat
and Right, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996, at B 1 (reporting that an officer "put herself in harms
way" by " breaching the 'blue wall of silence"'); Selwyn Raab, The Unwritten Code that
Stops Police from Speaking, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1985, at B4 (citing testimony of
Commissioner Ward acknowledging the code of silence as "an old tradition" in all police
forces).
203 See Carol Streiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 820,
835 (1994) ( "Despite widespread and frequent complaints about police corruption . . . [t]he
lack of effective regulation and concomitant corruption have persisted throughout the
twentieth century."); see also THOMAS J. DEAKIN, POLICE PROFESSIONALISM: THE
RENAISSANCE OF AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 200-215 ( 1988).
204 See generally SEYMOUR MANDELBAUM, Boss TwEED'S NEW YORK (1965) (detailing
rampant corruption throughout New York City political structure). The New York City
Police Department has been rocked by a major corruption scandal approximately every 20
years, as evidenced by the numerous commissions convened to investigate the department.
See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE POLICE
DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 30 (Jan. 18, 1895) [hereinafter LEXOW
COMMISSION REPORT] (Senator Clarence Lexow, Chair) (reporting that, between January l,
1891, to May 1, 1894, twelve officers were convicted of criminal neglect of duty; twelve of
oppression ; one each of indecent exposure, burglary and attempt at rape; fifty-six of assault
in the third degree; and forty-five of assault in the second degree); REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF ALDERMAN OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK APPOINTED AUGUST 5,
1912 TO INVESTIGATE THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (June 10, 1913) 6 [hereinafter CURRAN
COMMISSION REPORT] (Henry H. Curran, Chair) (reporting that "practically all of the
proprietors of gambling and disorderly houses in the City have been compelled to make
regular monthly payments to certain members of the Police Department"); FINAL REPORT
OF SAMUEL SEABURY, REFEREE, IN THE MATIER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
MAGISTRATE' S COURTS IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT AND THE MAGISTRATES
THEREOF, AND OF ATTORNEYS AT LAW PRACTICING IN SAID COURTS 80-96 (Mar. 28, 1932)
[hereinafter SEABURY REPORT] (Samuel Seabury, Referee) (detailing police "frame-ups"
and providing several examples); EDWARD SILVER, REPORT OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BY
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF KINGS COUNTY AND THE DECEMBER 1949 GRAND JURY,
DECEMBER 1949 TO APRIL 1954 9-13 (January 8, 1955) (citing several examples of
corruption, including police involvement in substantial gambling operations at Brooklyn
College); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION AND THE CITY' S ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES (Dec. 26, 1972) 83-84
[hereinafter KNAPP COMM'N REPORT] (Whitman Knapp, Chair) (describing practice of
phony arrests to satisfy quotas); see also William Murphy & Leonard Levitt, It 's Blue Deja

s.
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corruption that spread through urban police forces in the 1970s.205
Historically, the code of silence protected the traditional corruption
racket. 206 Today, the code of silence protects officers who violate civil rights
through violence and other misconduct. 207 The 1980s and 90s have brought to
light a new and more invidious code of silence, typified by the high-profile
cases of Rodney King208 and Abner Louima. 209 City governments are aware of
Vu: New Scandal Reads Like Old Police Stories, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 21, 1994 at 7
(discussing the similarities and differences between corruption scandals revealed by the
various commissions from 1894 to the present).
205
See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980) (dismissing case
where entire Philadelphia police force indicted for suppressing evidence that inculpates
police officers); see also Charles R. Babcock, Justice Accuses Philadelphia of Police
Abuses, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1979, at Al (noting that the "police department's practices
of abuse were directed at all persons but were especially harmful to the rights of blacks and
Hispanics"); In Chicago in the 70s, a six-year investigation of the police department led to
over 60 prison sentences and uncovered a long-standing relationship between the police,
organized crime and city government involving bribery, extortion, conspiracy, and perjury.
See CONTROL IN THE POLICE ORGANIZATION 23-4 (Maurice Punch ed., 1983). And in New
York City, a major inquiry conducted by the Knapp Commission in 1972 uncovered
institutionalized corruption throughout the police department, mainly involving officers
taking bribes to allow gamblers, prostitutes, and others to avoid arrest. In the Commission' s
words, "[t]he tradition of the policeman' s code of silence is so strong .. . that it was futile to
expect testimony [regarding corrupt activities] from any police officer." KNAPP COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 204, at 47.
206 See generally Hon. Harold Baer, Jr. & Joseph P. Annao, The Mallen Commission
Report: An Overview, 40 N.Y .L. SCH. L. REv. 73, 76 (1995) ("Gambling, prostitution and
other vice rackets are no longer the springboard to a career of corruption in the Police
Department as they were in times gone by. Corrupt cops . . .now actively engage in criminal
activity.").
207
See id.
208
The Rodney King incident implicates the police code of silence because it was carried
out with an attitude of impunity: the officers were apparently so certain that they would
suffer no recrimination for this assault that they communicated their actions to other officers
via official police radios, and even bragged to medical personnel caring for King that they
had inflicted the injuries he sustained. Victim's Account of Police Beating, L.A. TIMES,
March 7, 1991, at A21. See Martin Berg, Now, Time for the Real Thing: Trial in Rodney
King Beating Set to Start, L.A. DAILY J. (Feb. 3, 1992) (reporting that a police officer
defendant in the Rodney King trial was charged as an accessory after the fact for concealing
his conduct and that of other officers under his command).
209
See Berger, supra note 202 (responding to outrage over "nest of perjury" in Louima
incident, Mayor Giuliani ordered all officers to spend several hours in discussion groups);
see also Dan Barry, Officers' Silence Still Thwarting Torture Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
1997 at Al (noting that of 100 officers granted limited immunity in Louima torture case,
approximately 12 are expected to have knowledge of the incident, and only two have
provided valuable information); Claude Lewis, Fallout From the Brooklyn Torture Case,
THE RECORD, Sept. 9, 1997 at Ll3 (noting that officers fear that bystanders, remembering
"blue wall of silence" encountered in Louima case, will refuse to offer assistance when

66

BOSTON UNNERSJTY I.AW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:17

this growing problem, as evidenced by the many commissions and task forces
convened in major cities over the past decade to analyze the root causes of
police brutality and misconduct. For example, a 1994 Report on the New York
City Police Department uncovered evidence that police corruption has
flourished, in part, "because of a police culture that exalts loyalty over integrity
[and] the silence of honest officers who fear the consequences of 'ratting' on
another cop no matter how grave the crime."210 Similarly, the Los Angeles
commission convened in the wake of the Rodney King incident identified a
pervasive "officer code of silence," described by one officer as "a non-written
rule that you do not roll over, tell on your partner, your companion."211
Detailed reports studying the code of silence have discussed its impact on
police culture and the public perception of police officers. 212
Commission reports on corruption and brutality only begin to describe the

routine arrests present unforeseen trouble); see also supra note 6, and accompanying text
(providing additional details surrounding the torture of Abner Louima by New York City
police officers).
210 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION
AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT I (July 7, 1994)
[hereinafter MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT] (Milton Mallen, Chair).
21 I REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANG ELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
169 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT].
212 See, e.g., WICKERSHAM REPORT, supra note 1; 1961 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS
REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-12 (detailing two examples of police brutality where the state's
power to punish criminal behavior "may be blocked . . . by the fact that the potential
defendant is the person who must start up the machinery of the criminal Jaw"; PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE POLICE (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT];
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 162 (1968)
[hereinafter 1968 KERNER COMMISSION REPORT] (arguing that one possible source of Negro
hostility to police is the Jack of effective complaint mechanisms evidenced by the fact "that
policemen in some cities have little fear of punishment for using unnecessary force because
they appear to have a degree of immunity from their departments); U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO Is GUARDING THE GUARDIANS? 50 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT] (noting that citizens' complaints are valuable
because the code of silence often prevents internal police command from learning about
important problems); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, POLICE INTEGRITY: PUBLIC SERVICE
WITH HONOR (1997) [hereinafter POLICE INTEGRITY REPORT]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
REPORT, supra note 12, at 68-71 (stating that the Mollen Commission found the code of
silence strongest in New York City's most dangerous neighborhoods, and that one officer,
admitting to corrupt and brutal practices, never feared he would be turned in by another
officer); POLICE BRUTALITY AND EXCESSIVE FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT 4 (Amnesty International 1996) [hereinafter AMNESTY lNT'L REPORT] (citing
Mallen Commission and finding that senior officers practice "a deliberate 'blindness' to
corruption"); N.Y.C COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAKING THE Us V. THEM BARRIER:
A REPORT ON POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS (1993) [hereinafter BREAKING Us V. THEM
BARRIER].
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code of silence's role in police misconduct. In reality, police abuse continues
to exist primarily because of the code of silence. But for the knowledge that
misconduct will go unreported, a police officer would never mistreat a detainee
in the presence of other officers, falsely arrest or harass witnesses of police
misconduct, or orchestrate elaborate police cover-ups, including the
destruction of evidence, drafting false reports, and perjury. And if not for the
code of silence, a violent officer would not remain on a police force or carry a
weapon. And only the code of silence can account for the retaliation suffered
by law enforcement officers who dare to breach the code by reporting
misconduct by fellow officers.
While it is impossible to catalogue all of the ways in which the code of
silence facilitates police misconduct, the following three stories cover a
spectrum of injuries attributable to the code of silence, and provide useful
referents for the discussion below.
A.

The Officer Whose Repeated Violence Goes Unreported

On a spring night in 1977, high school seniors Jim Muse and Liz Brandon
parked in a secluded driveway and sat together in the front seat of the car. A
truck pulled up, and a man identifying himself as Memphis police officer
Robert Allen approached. Allen, who was off-duty, ordered Muse out of the
car. Without provocation, Allen viciously beat the young man with his fists
and cut him in the neck and ear with a knife. Allen then circled the car and
attempted to grab Brandon, but she quickly locked the passenger side door.
Muse used this opportunity to get back into the car and speed off. Frustrated,
Allen fired at the vehicle, shattering the front window. A high speed chase
terminated at a local hospital, where both Muse and Brandon were treated for
serious physical injuries and emotional stress stemming from the incident. 213
When other officers of the Memphis police force heard about Allen's
involvement in the incident, a collective groan went out over the department:
"Allen had done it again." 214 Prior to this incident, the general consensus
2 13

See Brandon v. Allen, 516 F. Supp. 1355, 1356-58 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (detailing the
unprovoked attack by Officer Allen on Elizabeth Brandon and James Muse, resulting in a §
1983 suit filed against Allen, the Police Chief, and the city of Memphis), reversed, 719 F.2d
151 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985); see also Stengel
v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975) (providing analogous§ 1983 claim where off-duty
police officer shot and killed two men and paralyzed another while acting under color of
state law). Allen was convicted and imprisoned for the incident involving Brandon and
Muse. Brandon, 516 F. Supp. at 1358. See also generally Brandon v. Allen, 645 F. Supp.
1261, 1264 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (awarding "compensatory damages to plaintiff Elizabeth
Brandon in the amount of $10,000 and to plaintiff James Sherman Muse in the amount of
$41,310.75, jointly and severally against the defendant John D. Holt, in his official capacity,
to be paid by the City of Memphis, Tennessee, and defendant Robert J. Allen in his personal
capacity"); see also infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text (discussing Brandon v. Allen
and the code of silence as police department custom).
2 14
Brandon, 516 F. Supp. at 1358.
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among officers had been that Allen was a "mental case" with a penchance for
violence, and no officer wanted to ride in the car with him. 215 Aware of
numerous violent prior acts by Allen on the job, officers expressed relief that
Allen had "finally done something this time that he can't get out of." 216 While
many officers had apparently wished that Allen be fired from the force before
this incident, not one had ever filed a formal complaint against him or reported
his behavior to a supervisor. 217 Over twenty citizen complaints had been filed
against Allen, but not one had been corroborated by police testimony. 218
B.

Officers Who Engage In Misconduct In the Presence Of Other Officers

On the evening of March 31, 1989, Andrew Sledd, a 23-year old AfricanAmerican attending St. Xavier College on a basketball scholarship, 219 was
preparing to take a shower in the Hyde Park townhouse he shared with his
mother, fiancee, and six-year-old brother. 220 At around 10:30 p.m., Sledd
heard loud banging on the front door. 221 He started down the stairs wearing
only a towel. He saw that the front door was hanging off its hinges, and a
group of men had entered the house. 222 Believing these men were intruders,
Sledd raced back up the stairs to retrieve his .22 caliber sport rifle. He told his
sleeping fiancee to stay put. 223 He turned and saw an armed African-American

215 Id. (noting that Allen "was known to have bragged about killing a man in the course
of duty," and he would "ceremoniously" don his "killing gloves" when called to the scene of
a crime).
216 Id.
217

See id. at 136 I (court notes that "due to a code of silence induced by peer pressure
among the rank-and-file officers and among some police supervisors, few-if any-formal
complaints were ever filed by police personnel" and found that the Police Director's
procedures "were highly conducive to 'covering up' officer misconduct"). The Police
Director himself candidly acknowledged: "We have never, since I have been director, had
the first single case where officers would really cooperate in terms of telling us on an
official basis what they knew about a fellow officer." Id.
218 See id. at 1358-59 (noting that none of the Police Director's new procedures
encouraged or imposed any duty on officers to file formal complaints against other officers).
219 Cam Simpson, City Settles Lawsuit From '89 Cop Raid, CHI. SUN TiMEs, Feb. 4,
1998, at 23. See Sledd v. Linsay, 102 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir. 1996) (detailing the events
with took place on March 31, 1989, at Sledd's residence in the South Side of Chicago).
220
See id.
221 See id. at 286 (describing the manner in which the officers entered Sledd's residence).
Sledd subsequently filed a § 1983 suit against the against the offending officers, the Chicago
Police Department, and the City of Chicago alleging, in part, that the Department
maintained a "custom" of the code of silence. The case eventually settled out of court for an
undisclosed sum. Telephone Interview with Erica Thompson, Attorney for Andrew Sledd,
People's Law Office, Chicago, IL (June 1998). See also infra text accompanying notes 25660.
222
See id.
223 See id. (describing Sledd's reaction to the presence of "intruders"); see also Steven P.
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man turning from the bedroom doorway to the stairwell.224
As Sledd pursued the man down the stairwell, he walked into a storm of
gunfire. Sledd was shot repeatedly and collapsed to the ground. A man
immediately rolled him over, put a gun to his head, and said "We're the police,
you asshole. I should blow your fucking brains out."225 The officer then
struck Sledd's head with his pistol, kicked him in the groin, and walked away,
ignoring his pleas for medical attention. 226
The incident left Sledd paralyzed from the waist down, and facing serious
criminal charges. 227 Although he didn't point his rifle at the police, he was
charged with attempted murder, armed violence, aggravated assault, and
possession of cocaine allegedly discovered in Sledd's coat pocket during a
subsequent search of the home. At trial, the officers testified that they had
knocked on Sledd's door, identified themselves as police, announced they had
a search warrant, and told Sledd to "freeze," but that he had responded by
firing his weapon at them. 228 The officers' stories were not credited and Sledd
was found innocent of all charges. 229
C.

Retaliation Against Officers Who Breach the Code of Silence

New York City Police Officer Paula White-Ruiz had been on the job a year
when she was partnered with Officer John Ward in the 66th Precinct. She and
Ward were searching an apartment where a man lay dead with a large sum of
cash in his pocket. Ward sent White-Ruiz out of the apartment to fetch his
memo book. When she returned, the money was gone. 230 She reported to her
department supervisors her suspicion that Ward had stolen the money. Her
allegations led to a number of interrogations of Ward, who was placed on
modified duty the same day, and eventually discharged. 231
Garmisa, Police Officers Granted Immunity for Shooting, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 13,
1994, at 6 (reiterating the contentions of the police officers regarding the events that took
place on March 31 , 1989).
224
See Sledd,102 F.3d at 286 (According to the court's findings, the African-American
man "was wearing blue jeans, a blue jacket, and white tennis shoes," but nothing bearing
Chicago Police Department insignia. As he ran from Sledd, the man shouted "he' s got a
gun, let' s get the fuck out of here.").
225
Id. (describing events that gave rise to Sledd' s § 1983 action against the officers).
226
See id.
227
See Andrew Martin, City Settles Costly Lawsuits, CHI. TRJB ., Apr. 30, 1998, at 3
(Metro-Chicago) (reporting that Sledd suffered serious nerve damage as the result of being
shot and was cleared of all criminal charges).
228
See Garmisa, supra note 223, at 6, and accompanying text (analyzing the testimony of
the police officers involved in the Sledd incident).
229
See Sledd, 102 F.3d at 287 (noting that Sledd was acquitted following a bench trial).
230
See Merle English, Panel Hears of Racism, Cronyism, Nepotism, and Sexism,
NEWSDAY, June 14, 1994, at A29 (providing report of events that led to Ward's dismissal).
23 1
See White-Ruiz v. City of New York, 983 F. Supp. 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(detailing events that led to the harassment of White-Ruiz); see also infra notes 254-70,
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Arriving at work the next day, White-Ruiz found herself shunned by fellow
officers. 232 Her report against Ward, including specific references to her, by
name, had been communicated to all commands via the Department's internal
teletype system. 233 That evening, as White-Ruiz prepared to go off-duty, she
found her car tires slashed. 234
Within the week, White-Ruiz was called before Captain Scagnelli, the
Precinct's commanding officer, who advised her to transfer to another
precinct. 235 White-Ruiz agreed to transfer to the 90th Precinct, where, on her
first day, she found the words "Black Bitch" scrawled on her locker. 236 One or
more officers told her that they had been made aware of her impending arrival
through the departmental grapevine, which had identified her as a "rat."237 In
the weeks that followed, White-Ruiz suffered further hostility: she was called a
"rat" and a "cheese-eater" during police radio transrnissions; 238 someone
anonymously sent a copy of the order dismissing Officer Ward to her home; 239
her car was vandalized; 240 her locker in the precinct tampered with; 241 she
received a series of anonymous, harassing telephone calls to her home; 242
graffiti appeared in the men's room of the station bearing her name and the
likeness of a large rat; 243 she discovered a dead rat lying next to her car; 244 and

290-99 and accompanying text (providing analysis of the police code of silence).
232
See id.
233 See id. (noting the inconsistency with the assurances of confidentiality White-Ruiz
had received regarding the reporting of police misconduct).
234
See id.
235
See id. Scagnelli explained to White-Ruiz that he was being reassigned to another
precinct and would be unable to shield her from future retaliation by other officers. See id.
236
See id. See also English, supra note 230, at A29 (noting that Ruiz found notes on her
locker that said "black bitch).
237
See White-Ruiz, 983 F. Supp. at 368.
238
See id. at 369.
239 See id. at 370.
White-Ruiz alleged that because officers' home addresses were
required to be kept confidential by the Department, . whoever had sent the letter"presumably a fellow officer"-was being helped by others at the precinct, who were
apparently "willing to go so far as to breach security." Id.
240
See NYPD Blues: New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton Works To
Break The Policeman's Code Of Silence And Expose Corruption, Eye to Eye With Connie
Chung (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 21, 1994) (interviews with then-New York City
Police Commissioner, William Bratton, and police officers, including White-Ruiz,
discussing the police code of silence).
241
See id.
242
See White-Ruiz, 983 F. Supp. at 371. See also Eye to Eye, supra note 240.
243 See White-Ruiz, 983 F. Supp. at 371. Apparently, the graffiti also referred to another
officer, Hector Ariza, who had publicly criticized the Department's discriminatory law
enforcement methods, and was therefore also viewed as a "rat" by fellow officers. Id.; see
also Ariza v. City of New York, No. CV-93-5287, 1996 WL 118535, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996) (discussing Ariza' s allegations that "his name and the names of other
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in a particularly chilling incident, officers refused her repeated requests for
back-up in a dangerous situation, going so far as to jam the frequencies on the
radio she was using to call headquarters for help. 245
White-Ruiz complained to her supervisors about these incidents, but her
complaints resulted only in a series of undesirable assignment changes and
post-transfers. 246 She also complained to the appropriate authorities about the
harassment she had experienced, contacting the Department's Office of
Employment Opportunity, individuals in the Internal Affairs Department, and
then-Commissioner Raymond Kelly. 247 Nothing worked, however, and she
remained a pariah of the department, unable to do her job safely and
effectively.248
D. Common Threads: Injuries Result From the Police Code of Silence

These three "stories," while vastly different, have one thing in common: the
injuries they describe all resulted from the police code of silence. Even if the
code of silence is defined narrowly to mean nothing more than "thou shalt not
rat on a fellow officer" it is apparent from these three stories that there are
innumerable and diverse ways in which devotion to this rule may cause
injuries and constitutional deprivations.
A proper appreciation of the
implications of the code of silence is critical to understanding the custom
theory of municipal liability.

officers were displayed on bathroom walls in the precinct along with the word 'rat' in
reference to their speaking out against police malfeasance").
244
See White-Ruiz, 983 F. Supp. at 371. See also NYPD Blues, supra note 240.
According to the MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, strikingly similar incidents have occurred to
other officers who have reported police corruption or misconduct. MOLLEN COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 210, at 51-60. In one instance, a police captain who had disciplined
subordinates for misconduct and reported acts of police brutality had to be transferred 38
times. Id. at 54. Apparently, "[i]n almost every case, on the very day he arrived to report
for duty at his new command, he found evidence that his reputation had preceded him. At
one command, his locker was burned; at another, his car tires were slashed; at another, he
received threats of physical harm." Id. Similarly, a detective in the Internal Affairs
Division who was transferred to a precinct detective squad testified that his colleagues
"placed dead rats on his car windshield, stole or destroyed his personal property, and told
him directly that he could not count on them times of danger." Id. at 55.
245
See White-Ruiz, 983 F. Supp. at 370.
246
See White-Ruiz v. City of New York, No. CIV-93-7233, 1996 WL 603983, at*2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1996) ("Plaintiff further alleges that, throughout the period from 1989 to
1991, she also suffered retaliatory assignment changes and inappropriate posts, which did
not adequately reflect her seniority").
247 See White-Ruiz, 983 F. Supp. at 378-79.
When White-Ruiz contacted the
Department's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity to lodge a complaint, she was told
that the "whistleblower" nature of her case placed it outside the jurisdiction of that office.
Id.
248
See id.
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THE PROMISE OF "CUSTOM"

Drawing on the pre-Monell standards for "custom" claims articulated by the
Supreme Court,249 and the post-Monell jurisprudence of the lower federal
courts, 250 it seems relatively clear that a claimant seeking to predicate
municipal liability on the existence of the code of silence as an
unconstitutional "custom" would have to show that the code is a "widespread
practice"251 of which the municipality "knew or should have known,"252 and
249
In Monell, the Court cited a previous case, Adickes, in its discussion of custom and
municipal liability:
local governments . . . may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to
governmental "custom" even though such a custom has not received formal approval
through the body's official decisionmaking channels. As Mr. Justice Harlan, writing
for the Court, said in Adickes ... "Congress included customs and usages [in § 1983]
because of the persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state officials .. . .
Although not authorized by written law, such practices of state officials could well be
so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)).
As previously noted, the Supreme Court had only directly addressed "custom" under§ 1983
in Adickes, a pre-Monell case. While Adickes was decided prior to the extension of liability
to municipal governments, the Court's analysis of the statutory "custom" language informs
our understanding of "custom" in the post-Monell era. See id. at 166-68 (finding that
custom under § 1983 "requires state involvement and is not simply a practice that reflects
longstanding social habits, generally observed by the people in a locality," and that "settled
practices of state officials may, by imposing sanctions or withholding benefits, transform
private predilections into compulsory rules of behavior no less than legislative
pronouncements.")
250 A number of circuits have adopted the language of Monell in discussing custombased § 1983 municipal liability claims. See Sorlucco v. New York Police Dep't, 971 F.2d
864, 870 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that "the policy or custom used to anchor liability need not
be contained in an explicitly adopted rule or regulation" so long as the "practices are
persistent and widespread, and thus, so permanent and well-settled as to constitute 'custom
and usage."'); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[A]
course of conduct is considered to be a 'custom' when, though not authorized by law, 'such
practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute
law."') (quoting Monell, 436 U.S . at 690).
251 See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (noting that to prove § 1983 liability based on
custom, plaintiff must establish the existence of a widespread practice that, "although not
authorized by written law or express municipal policy . . . is so permanent and well settled
as to constitute custom or usage with the force of law").
252
See Fletcher v. O'Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793-94 (3d Cir. 1989). (noting that
"[c]ustom may be established by proof of knowledge and acquiescence."); Spell v.
McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that "[a]ctual knowledge may be
evidenced by recorded reports to or discussions by a municipal governing body ... [and
c]onstructive knowledge may be evidenced by the fact that the practices have been so
widespread or flagrant that in the proper exercise of its responsibilities the governing body
should have known of them") (citing Bennet v. Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1984)
(en bane)).
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that the code itself caused the complainant's injury. 253
I will address first the element of causation, which is seemingly most
problematic of the three. I will then briefly outline the other elements required
to establish the code of silence as an unconstitutional "custom" within the
meaning of § 1983.
A.

The Code of Silence Causes (Colloquially) Constitutional Injury

The stories recounted above in Part V reveal a cross-section of causative
modalities-ways in which the code of silence causes constitutional harms.
Officer Allen's brutal and unprovoked attack on two teenagers in Memphis, for
example, was a function of the code of silence. 254 The code dictated that none
of Allen's fellow officers would ever give statements corroborating any of the
c1t1zen complaints against Allen, 255 or report his violent behavior
themselves. 256 Andrew Sledd's story exemplifies the sense of confidence
253
See Spell, 824 F.2d at 1387 (noting that when a municipal policy or custom is
unconstitutional, "the causal connection between policy and violation is manifest and does
not require independent proof," but that when a policy or custom is not unconstitutional it
must be shown to have caused the violation: "[p]roof merely that such a policy or custom
was 'likely' to cause a particular violation is not sufficient; there must be proven at least an
'affirmative link' between policy or custom and violation .... ") (citing City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23, 833 n.9) (Brennan J., dissenting).
254
See Brandon v. Allen, 645 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (finding that
"there was throughout the Department a code of silence binding patrolmen and supervisors
alike not to testify against or report on their colleagues . . . . That code was enforced by peer
pressure, and tacitly sanctioned by the refusal of the Department to impose on its employees
any obligation to disclose, even under questioning, misconduct by their fellow officers.")
The Brandon court held that the code was "was precisely the sort of custom referred to in
Monell." Id.
155
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT supra note 12, at 5 (study of 14 U.S.
cities found that most police departments' internal affairs units "conducted substandard
investigations, sustained few allegations of excessive force, and failed to identify and punish
officers against whom repeated complaints had been filed; these units "often shielded
officers who committed human rights violations from exposure and guaranteed them
immunity from disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution" rather than investigating the
alleged misconduct).
256
The fact that no other officer reported Allen, who was universally regarded as a
"fringe" cop, a "mental case" that everyone feared, reveals just how indiscriminate the code
can be. The code protects any and all officers from complaints, no matter how they are
viewed by their colleagues.
See generally, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 212, at 211 ("Whenever a number of dishonest officers are
tolerated by other officers within a police organization, an atmosphere of mutual support
and protection may develop, and eventually it may taint the entire police system."); COHEN
& FELDBERG, supra note 56, at 7-8 (noting t,hat police work can "drive its practitioners
together in such strong fraternal bonds" that a "structural immorality" is created that causes
"even those offers who will not go along with the illegalities [to] compromise their sense of
integrity by looking the other way rather than revealing these abuses); SKOLNICK & FYFE,
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produced by the code of silence. The officers who entered Sledd's home and
shot him without identifying themselves as police knew that no matter what
crimes they committed in that home, they would back one another's stories up
and nothing would come of it. 257
The Sledd case also highlights the disproportionate impact of the code of
silence on poor and minority populations. 258 Officers' confidence that their
supra note 186, at 90-92 (arguing that the "fundamental culture of policing" involves
"danger, authority, and the mandate to use coercive force," and that this combination may
result in "a banding together, a cover-up, a conspiracy of silence"); Gabriel J. Chin & Scott
C. Wells, The Blue Wall of Silence As Evidence of Bias And Motive To lie: A New
Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REv. 233, 252 (1998) (stating that "the closed
nature of the [police] culture, the resentment of police by the public, the dangers and
volatility of police work, and officers' dependence upon one another for mutual safety,
spawns a strong loyalty on the part of police officers to each other").
"'According to David Rudowsky, similar attitudes contributed to the Rodney King incident:
The officers involved had to be fully confident of their colleagues' silence and of their
department's dismissal of any complaints made by the numerous witnesses to this
incident. Indeed, so sure were these officers of their immunity from punishment that
they bragged about their abuses on the official police computer system and to medical
personnel at the hospital where King was belatedly taken for treatment. Only officers
assured by prior experience and knowledge of departmental attitudes that the
department would not investigate or punish this type of abuse (regardless of the
credibility of the witnesses or of their own incriminating statements) could have
rationally taken the risk of engaging in this type of behavior.
Rudovsky, supra note 11, at 482.
258
See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 211, at 70 (finding that "[w]ithin
minority communities of Los Angeles, there is a widely-held view that police misconduct is
commonplace. The King beating refocused public attention on long-standing complaints by
African-Americans, Latinos and Asians that LAPD officers frequently treat minorities
differently from whites, more often using disrespectful and abusive language, employing
unnecessarily intrusive practices . . . and engaging in use of excessive force when dealing
with minorities"); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, supra note 12, at 39 (finding that
minorities allege violations by police "more frequently than white residents, and far out of
proportion to their representation in those cities" examined in the study); 1968 KERNER
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 212, at 5 (noting that "to some Negroes, police have come
to symbolize white power, white racism, and white repression . . . . The atmosphere of
hostility and cynicism is reinforced by a widespread belief among Negroes in the existence
of police brutality and in a 'double standard' of justice and protection--one for Negroes
and one for whites.") ST. CLAIR COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
MANAGEM ENT REVIEW COMMITTEE, 124 (1992) [hereinafter ST. CLAIR REPORT] (examining
the Boston Police Department and finding that 50% of complainants in the sample group
were African-American, while only 26% of Boston's population was African-American);
SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 186, at 24 (the authors argue that contemporary police often
brutalize members of a feared "outgroup"-some population thought to be "undesirable,
undeserving and underpunished by established law"-with the result that victims of police
brutality are often members of racial or ethnic minorities) ; Paul Hoffman, The Feds, lies,

and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Fe<ieral Role in Controlling Police Abuse in
Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1471-82 (1993) (arguing that: (I) the beating of
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version of events will be believed depends on factors such as the race and
socio-economic status of persons urging a contrary account of events. If not
for the fact that Sledd himself was a college basketball star with no criminal
record, it is possible that the officers' version of events-rifle-toting, drugdealing, black male in South Side apartment fires assault rifle at cops-would
have been believed. This point is certainly not lost on minority communities:
disproportionately the victims of police violence, 259 minorities are generally
disinclined to stake their word against that of the police. 260
Paula White-Ruiz suffered the injuries she did because she dared to breach
the code of silence. No code can be effective without the threat of
enforcement, and the White-Ruiz story illustrates the retaliation faced by
officers who dare to report police misconduct. Police officers observe this subcultural allegiance because they are made to understand-by examples, stories,
and myth-what happens to those who don't. 261 The stories of officers who

Rodney King was part of a pattern of abuse by Los Angeles police officers directed against
young African American and Latino men; and (2) the police department tolerated that
abuse).
259
See James Barron, New York Study of Police Finds No Wide Misuse of Deadly Force,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1987, at Al, B4 (noting that a New York State commission appointed
by then-Governor Mario Cuomo concluded that 73% of those killed by white officers were
African-American or Hispanic, while 27% of those killed by white officers were white and
that 79% of those killed by non-white officers were minorities, while 21 % were white. Id.
See also Selwyn Raab, City's Police Brutality Report Card: Complaints Down, Needs
Improving , N .Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at 41 (reporting that in 1996, 80% of New York
City police misconduct complaints were filed by Blacks, Latinos, and Asians).
260 See Rudovsky, supra note 11 ("Because police abuse is most often directed against
those without political power or social status, their complaints are often dismissed or
ignored."); Daniel Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247,
284 (1988) (noting that victims of constitutional misconduct by local law enforcement are
often individuals who "are in contact with the criminal justice system, generally as suspects
or defendants," and are unlikely to bring suit because of "ignorance of their rights, poverty,
fear of police reprisals or the burdens of incarceration.")
261
See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 211, at 170 (finding that officers
who give evidence of misconduct against fellow officers "are often ostracized and harassed,
and in some instances themselves become the target of complaints."); MOLLEN COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 210, at 53 (noting that "[o]fficers who report misconduct are ostracized
and harassed; become targets of complaints and even physical threats; and are made to fear
that they will be left alone on the streets in a time of crisis This draconian enforcement of
the code of silence fuels corruption because it makes corrupt cops feel protected and
invulnerable."); SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 186, at 110-11 (contending that "the code ...
typically is enforced by the threat of shunning, by fear that informing will lead to exposure
of one's own derelictions, and by fear that colleagues' assistance may be withheld in
emergencies."); Maurice Possley & Andrew Martin, ' Code ' is Cracking in Austin Case:
Wall of Secrecy Around Corruption Begins to Crumble, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 1997, at I
(noting officers' fear of ostracism by those considered "family").
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have breached the code of silence, like White-Ruiz, are the stuff that legends
(and implicit warnings) are made of. 262 While Al Pacino fans may recall
"Serpico" for its protagonist's triumphant testimony before the Knapp
Commission on police corruption,263 generations of NYPD officers will better
remember Frank Serpico for the bullet he received in the back of the head
during a Brooklyn drug raid-reportedly by the very same colleagues he had
"ratted" on to the commission. 264
The code of silence is at work when offending officers take actions to ensure
that evidence contradicting their version of events does not become public.
The code of silence is clearly a "but for" cause of injuries suffered by citizens
whose rights are impaired by these cover-up operations. Efforts to undermine
or cover up evidence of police misconduct may take many forms, including:
the confiscation of photographic evidence;265 actions to undermine potential
262
Former NYPD officer Bernard Cawley testified before the Mollen Commission that
he never feared another officer would turn him in:
Cops don't tell on cops. And if they did tell on them, just say if a cop decided to tell on
me, his career's ruined. He's going to be labeled a rat. So if he's got fifteen more
years to go on the job, he's going to be miserable because it follows you wherever you
go ... he's going to have nobody to work with. And chances are, if it comes down to
it, they 're going to let him get hurt.
MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 210, at 53-54. Another officer explained, "[S]ee,
we're all blue ... we have to protect each other no matter what." Id. at 58. See also
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 211, at 170 (containing the testimony of an
officer who indicated that he was forced out of the police department for corroborating a
suspect's report of being beaten by police and the public statement of another officer that
breaking the code of silence "will mark the end of [an officer's] career"); Selwyn Raab, The
Unwritten Code that Stops Police from Speaking, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1985, S4 at 6
(quoting an anonymous New York City police officer: "If they mark you as a 'rat,' you're
finished on the job ....").
263
New York City police officer Frank Serpico testified before the Knapp Commission
regarding corruption within the Police Department. KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT at vii.
Serpico was portrayed by actor Al Pacino in a 1973 motion picture chronicling the officer's
life and involvement in anti-corruption investigations. SERPICO (Paramount Pictures 1973).
264 See Nat Hentoff, Howard Safir Should Resign Says Serpico, THE VILLAGE VOICE,
June 16, 1998, at 20 (describing how Serpico was shot in the face when his back-up team
failed him during a "buy and bust" operation and noting that "[n]ow as then, even honest
cops are afraid to report corruption and brutality because of what happens to 'rats' in the
department."); see also Chris Sturgis, Serpico To Students: Integrity Is Crucial, TIMES
UNION, June 6, 1998, at B7, available in 1998 WL 7261323 (noting that some believe
Serpico was set up by "colleagues who were angered by his speaking out against police
corruption").
265
For example, in Farrar v. Davis, the plaintiff observed police officers beating a
handcuffed man and videotaped the incident. Farrar v. Davis, No. 97C6433, 1998 WL
142368, at * l (N.D. Ill., Mar. 19, 1998). Still filming, she approached the group of
offending officers and informed one of them that she had seen him beat the man in the face
and planned to report him to the United States Attorney. Id. When the officers ignored her,
plaintiff "commented in the general direction of the remaining officers, although to no one
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victim-witnesses (e.g., the planting of drugs on Andrew Sledd);266 destruction
of evidence;267 filing false charges against victims of brutality (e.g., false
charges of attempted murder and assault on an officer filed against Andrew
Sledd); 268 police perjury (e.g., the false testimony of police officers in Andrew
Sledd's criminal trial); 269 and concerted efforts to dissuade complainants from

in particular, that they were paid to uphold the law, not to break it." Id. One of the officers
then grabbed the plaintiff and arrested her. Id. She was taken to the police station where
she was detained for over ten hours,. Id. Meanwhile, one of the officers confiscated her
camera and erased the videotape. Id. The plaintiff brought a § 1983 suit against the city,
alleging that the officers unlawfully arrested and detained her and destroyed her videotape
of an incident of excessive force because of a pervasive code of silence in the police
department. Id. at *2.
266 The planting of evidence on suspected felons-"frame-ups"- is a particularly
common complaint. See Chin & Wells, supra note 256, at 246-47 (discussing "frame-ups"
in the context of a recent case where New Yorker Daniel Batista was convicted of criminal
possession of a weapon: "Batista's claim, supported by several civilian witnesses, was that
the officers planted the gun after the keys they confiscated from him failed to open the door
of apartments the officers wanted to rob .. . Batista's conviction was vacated only after he
has served his prison sentence.").
267
In Albany, New York, six state police officers were indicted for a false-evidence
scandal, which resulted in dozens of these officers' prior cases being reopened for review.
See Richard Perez-Pena, Troopers' Supervisor Faulted in Evidence Tampering Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1997, at Bl. And in September 1999, the Los Angeles Police
Department's criminal investigation into the Rampart Division-a cadre of officers charged
with law enforcement in one of the toughest neighborhoods in the city-uncovered alleged
unjustified shootings, beatings, drug dealing, planting of evidence, false arrests, witness
intimidation and perjury by police officers.. Eleven criminal convictions already have been
overturned as a consequence of the investigation and, to date, 20 officers have resigned or
been relieved of duty, suspended without pay or fired in connection with the scandal. See
Matt Lait, D.A. Seeks to Void JO More Rampart Cases, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2000, at Al.
268
See Chin & Wells, supra note 256, at 256 (noting that "[p)olice created false
excessive force claims by simply adding bogus charges of resisting arrest to their arrest
reports, and sticking to the stories at trial ... [and] where more .than one officer was
involved in the wrongful conduct or present at the scene, the officers would agree upon a
common false tale, and use that tale in complicity to justify the actions"); Rudovsky, supra
note 11, at 481 (arguing that, when faced with charges of wrongful arrest, an officer may
justify arrest through fabricating evidence of assault; because of the code of silence, "other
officers would testify either that they did not observe the incident or confirm the fabrication
and testify that the arresting officers acted properly in self-defense"); Alan Dershowitz, A
Police Badge is Not a License to Commit Perjury, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 4, 1991, at
Bl 1, Bl l (arguing that in cases involving allegations of police brutality or misconduct,
officers will conceal or justify their malfeasance or that of a fellow officer with "boilerplate"
allegations against the victim).
269
See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 210, at 36 ("the practice of police
falsification . . . is so common in certain precincts that it has spawned its own word:
'testilying. '"); Chin & Wells, supra note 256, _at 256 (discussing the willingness of police to
perjure themselves to protect their fellow officers as a function of the "overwhelming
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reporting police abuse.270
B.

The Failures of "Policy "

It is instructive to pause here to consider whether these plaintiffs could have
claimed their injuries were caused by municipal "policy," in any of the various
formulations. described in Part II. For example, could the two teenagers
attacked by Officer Brandon have alleged that his actions were the product of a
formal departmental policy or a decision made by a final policymaker? Absent
extraordinary circumstances, the answer would clearly be no. 271 Moreover, if
the case were to arise today, in the post-Bryan County era, plaintiffs would not
succeed on a theory that the Memphis Police Department failed adequately to
screen out the "mental case" Officer Allen, unless they could show their
injuries were a "plainly obvious consequence" of that singular hiring
decision. 272
Likewise, Sledd's injuries can hardly be laid at the feet of any municipal
"policy." The police officers who illegally entered Sledd's home, shot him,
and later lied about the incident were clearly not authorized to engage in these
actions by any written policy or decision by a final policymaker. The plaintiff
did include in his original complaint a claim for municipal liability based on
the failure to "properly supervise, discipline, transfer, counsel and otherwise
pressure placed upon the officer to heed the police code of silence"); Morgan Cloud, Judges,
"Testilying," and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1341, 1341-44, 1387 (1996)
(discussing the implications of police perjury in the search and seizure context and
suggesting that judges should adopt a two-part test that examines subjective motive and
objective reasonableness).
270
See HUMAN RlGHTS w ATCH REPORT, supra note I 2, at 50 (noting that "filing a
complaint is unnecessarily difficult and often intimidating" and discussing "one of the most
notorious dissuasion efforts" that occurred when Rodney King's brother tried to complain
after the beating and "the sergeant on duty treated him skeptically, asked whether he had
ever been in trouble, and never filled out a complaint form.") (citing CHRISTOPHER
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 211, at 10.)
27 1
It so happens there were extraordinary circumstances at work in Brandon v. Allen. In
particular, the district court found that the Memphis Police Department in the 1970s had a
"policy never to show the [Police] Director complaints or internal reports regarding police
brutality," and the Department "imposed on its supervisors no duty to discover officers who
might have dangerous propensities, and no duty to report known problems ...." Brandon v.
Allen, 645 F. Supp. 1261 , 1266 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). Further, pursuant to the police
collective bargaining agreement, it was "a policy of the Department never to reassign an
officer from a position for disciplinary reasons." Id. at 1267. Finally, any "disciplinary
action involving the dismissal of an officer ... required approval of the City Civil Service
Commission." Id. According to the Director, it was the policy of the Commission "never
to uphold the dismissal of an officer if it were based on violent misconduct." Id. In the end,
the plaintiffs prevailed by proving these unconstitutional policies, as well as the
maintenance of an unconstitutional custom in the form of the code of silence. see id.
272
Board of the County Comm' rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 412-13
(1997).
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control abusive police officers." 273 The district court dismissed this claim on
the grounds that Sledd had "failed to identify specific factual patterns in
[departmental] complaints that are relevant to the alleged deprivation of his
rights." 274 The district court held in essence that while the plaintiff had alleged
a widespread failure to investigate and discipline officer wrongdoing on the
departmental level, he failed to show that any such municipal failure caused
his injuries. 275
In reversing the district court's dismissal, the circuit court essentially recast
the plaintiffs boilerplate "failure to [blank]" claim as one based on the custom
of a code of silence: "Sledd did . . . specifically allege that the City and the
CPD [Chicago Police Department] maintained a code of silence; that
disciplinary complaints almost never resulted in official censure; and that this
practice hurt him in particular, by making the officers believe their actions
would never be scrutinized."276 The circuit court here saw what the district
court missed: while Sledd could not meet the causation element required to
make out a "failure to [blank]" claim of municipal policy, he had alleged
sufficiently widespread misconduct to make out a custom claim. 277

273

See Sledd v. Lindsay, 780 F. Supp. 554,557 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
Id. at 558. The lower court's dismissal of Sledd's claim highlights the evidentiary
problems faced by plaintiffs who allege a municipal policy of inadequate investigation of
misconduct complaints. In particular, the district court rejected plaintiffs argument that
only one to two percent of police misconduct complaints were substantiated in the
departmental review process, reasoning that plaintiff was unable to show that a greater
percentage of complaints were in fact meritorious. Id. at 559. Similarly, the court faulted
plaintiffs failure to "identifly] structural defects in the police disciplinary system with
relatively simple solutions." Id. In addressing the problem of remedies, the court asked:
What should the City's policymakers have done? Always believed the accuser in oneon-one credibility contests? Flipped a coin? Given [the investigative department] an
unlimited investigation budget? Forced police officers to testify against other officers?
Suspended officers facing complaints until the allegations against them are disproven?
Suspended or fired officers with repeated complaints, regardless of the merits of the
complaints?
Id. The court went on to acknowledge that "Sledd, of course, is not required to suggest
remedies," but noted that "a plaintiff must offer much more specificity in showing the
problems which the municipality should have prevented or corrected." Id.; see also infra
note 277 and accompanying text.
275
See Sledd, 780 F. Supp. at 558 (holding that "in .sum, Sledd had failed to plead facts
sufficient to show a City policy or custom, or 'deliberate indifference' by a City
policymaker to constitutional violations, that proximately caused the alleged violations of
Sledd's rights").
276
Sledd v. Linsay, 102 F.3d 282, 289 (7th Cir. 1996)
277
Sledd was able to muster some very specific evidence concerning the breadth of the
code of silence within the Chicago Police Department. In particular, Sledd showed "that
only one police officer ... among the thousands who gave statements or testified in the
scores of alleged misconduct complaints . . . [had ever] implicated his fellow officers in
brutality or unconstitutional conduct." Sledd, 780 F. Supp. at 557.
274
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The inability of the '.'failure to [blank]" model of policy to capture the harms
described in the stories above is nowhere clearer than in the case of Officer
White-Ruiz. In fact, her complaint alleged that her fellow officers' actions in
enforcing the code of silence resulted from a municipal failure to train. WhiteRuiz apparently abandoned this theory at trial, 278 perhaps recognizing that she
would be unable to prove that her injuries could have been averted if the
NYPD included in its academy regimen a training session admonishing
recruits to cooperate in investigations of officer wrongdoing or to refrain from
retaliating against officers who themselves report misconduct. Her injuries
were not the product of a municipal policy of inadequate training, but rather, as
the court held, of "an unwritten Departmental policy . . . that sanctioned a
'custom or usage' by lower-level officials and officers (1) to discourage
reporting of corrupt acts by police officers and (2) to retaliate against officers
who did bring such misconduct to the attention of Department authorities."279
C.

The Code of Silence Causes Constitutional Injury

While common sense dictates that a police code of silence may be a "but
for" cause of injury, a § 1983 plaintiff must also show that this custom
proximately caused the complained of injury. 280 Proximate cause requires
foreseeability; traditional tort law principles of causation are satisfied if
plaintiffs can show that the code of silence is reasonably likely to cause
constitutional injury. 281 In analyzing the causation requirement as it applies to
custom claims, lower federal courts have looked to these traditional tort law
principles, and held "a sufficiently close causal link between .. . a known but
uncorrected custom or usage and a specific violation is established if
occurrence of the specific violation was made reasonably probable by
permitted continuation of the custom."282
The question remains, however, whether custom claims will be affected by
· the heightened causation standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Bryan
County, discussed earlier.283 In that case, the Court significantly raised the bar
on causation, requiring plaintiffs proceeding under a failure to screen theory to
show that their injuries were a "plainly obvious consequence" of municipal

278

See White-Ruiz v. City of New York, No. CIV-93-7233, 1996 WL 603983, at*IO
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1996).
279 White-Ruiz v. City of New York, 983 F. Supp. 365, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (italics
added). The court, in determining that such a "custom or usage" existed, relied in part on
the findings of the MOLLEN REPORT. Id. at 391.
280 See Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
691-92 (1978) (finding that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless its
official policy caused a "constitutional tort").
28 1 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W ..PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 991 (5th ed. 1984).
282
Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1391 (4th Cir. 1987).
283 See supra Part III.C.
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action, and not merely a "likely" result. 284 The Court's decision in Bryan
County, by its terms, has no application to custom cases, where plaintiffs are
required to show widespread, pervasive constitutional misconduct. Justice
O'Connor's majority decision makes clear that the "plainly obvious
consequence" standard applies only where there is no recurring pattern of
violations; the heightened standard is necessary to gauge the likelihood that
constitutional violations will flow from an isolated municipal hiring
decision. 285 Additionally, the Bryan County Court specifically distinguished
cases involving an isolated, inadequate screening from general failure-to-train
cases, which typically do involve recurring violations, stating that in the latter
category, "the high degree of predictability may also ... support an inference
of causation."286 Based on the limits the Court imposed on the use of the
"plainly obvious consequence" standard, the heightened standard has no
application to custom cases, as custom claims necessarily require widespread,
pervasive, constitutional misconduct. 287
Likewise, § 1983 claims based upon a code of silence that results in
pervasive, unconstitutional conduct fall well outside the ambit of "isolated
incident" cases. Further, it can hardly be doubted that where a police code of
silence-in all of its various manifestations-exists, it is "highly predictable"
that c·onstitutional deprivations will result. The "silence" at the center of a code
exists for the primary purpose of shrouding constitutional deprivations. 288 If
the code of silence was a written police department edict prohibiting any
284

Board ofComm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1997).
Id. at 408 (finding that a higher standard applies when an isolated incident is disputed;
when "the [municipality's] decision necessarily governs a single case, there can be no notice
to the municipal decision maker, based on previous violations of federally protected rights,
that his approach is inadequate").
286
Id. at 409-10.
287
See Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970) (noting that "practices of state
officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage'
with the force of law"); see also Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658,691 (1978) (quoting this exact passage from Adickes in discussing
custom claims); cf Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362
(1940). The Browning Court noted:
It would be a narrow conception of justice to confine the notion of 'laws' to what is
found written on the statute books, and to disregard the gloss which life has written
upon it. Settled state practice . . . can establish what is state law . . . . Deeply
embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy ... are often tougher and truer
law than the dead words of the written text.
Id. at 369.
288
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 211, and accompanying text
(finding that for the Los Angeles Police Department, the "greatest single barrier to the
effective investigation and adjudication of complaints is the officers' unwritten code of
silence: an officer does not provide adverse information against a fellow officer"); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, supra note 12, at 68 (noting the silence of police officers
when misconduct occurs).
285
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officer from corroborating or initiating any allegation of wrongdoing against a
fellow officer, no one would doubt that constitutional deprivations would be
"highly" likely to result. Thus, when existence of a code of silence is
established, combined with the widespread knowledge that such codes exist in
order to silence and protect police officers, the requisite causal connection is
clear.289
D.

The Code Is "Widespread" and Known to the Brass

In addition to establishing causation, to win a custom claim in a police code
of silence case, a plaintiff must show (1) that the police code is a "widespread
practice;" and (2) that the relevant city officials "knew or should have known"
of its existence. 29 First, to establish a "widespread practice," custom plaintiffs
must point to a pattern of conduct that violates constitutional rights. 291 Second,
as a practical matter, a showing that a pervasive pattern of conduct exists, is
generally sufficient to satisfy the requirement that high-ranking officials "knew
of, or should have known" of the complained-of practice. 292
The pervasiveness of the police code of silence is evident in the reports by
various 'blue-ribbon' commissions and task forces convened in recent years to
study intractable police department problems, such as the use of excessive
force and police corruption. 293 For example, in 1991, the Christopher

°

289
As an evidentiary matter, in many code of silence cases the plaintiff will be able to
satisfy the "highly predictable consequence" standard in code of silence cases once the
plaintiff has shown that the practice was "widespread" and "known to policymakers."
Evidence that can be used to demonstrate that constitutional deprivations are "highly
predictable consequences' of a pervasive code of silence includes commission reports, other
civil rights cases, and the testimony of municipal officials and officers.
290
See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390-91 (4th Cir. 1987).
291
See id. at 1391 (stating that "fault for a violation resulting from condoned custom can
only be ascribed when a pattern of comparable practices has become actually or
constructively known to responsible policymakers"). Courts generally agree that § 1983
plaintiffs cannot simply use their own injury to prove widespread misconduct. See, e.g. ,
Armstead v. City of St. Petersburg, No. 95-l548-Civ-T-17C, 1997 WL 724420, at *7 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 13, 1997) (holding that plaintiffs cause of action failed since she did not establish
a citywide custom by pointing only to violative, discriminatory conduct that occurred in
relation to her).
292
See Spell, 824 F.2d at I 391 (finding that knowledge may be imputed when a
widespread pattern exists, as officials have a duty to be informed of such policies); see also
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 995-96 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that as police
custom of keeping "street files" was long-standing and department-wide, jury was entitled
"to conclude that it had been consciously approved at the highest policymaking level for
decisions involving the police department").
293 See, e. g., MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 210, at 53 (finding that New York
Police Department officers did not fear that other officers would testify against them due to
the "Blue Wall of Silence"). Whether or not a plaintiff will be allowed to introduce such
reports into evidence is another matter. In recent years, courts have disagreed regarding the
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Commission, convened in the wake of the Rodney King incident, identified a
pervasive "officer code of silence." 294 The Commission described the Los
Angeles Police Department code as follows: "[I]t consists of one simple rule,
an officer does not provide adverse information against a fellow officer."295
The Christopher Commission Report found that the code made officers
generally unwilling to "rat" on one other, such that they would often perjure
themselves rather than be perceived as a "whistle blower."296 Although the
Report concedes that a small but significant number of "bad cops" account for
most incidents of excessive force, it does make clear that all cops, including
"good cops," adhere to the code of silence, even where the result is to shield
"bad cops" from the consequences of their actions. 297 The Report also makes
clear that high-ranking Los Angeles Police Department officials knew of the
existence of the officer code of silence before the Christopher Commission
began its investigation. 298 As a result, the Christopher Commission Report

admissibility into evidence of such reports. Compare White-Ruiz v. City of New York, 983
F. Supp. 365, 380-382 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing plaintiff to introduce MOLLEN
COMMISSION REPORT into evidence and frequently referencing the Commission's findings in
the opinion), Ariza v. City of New York, No. CV-93-5287, 1996 WL 118535, at *5-6
(E.D.N.Y. March 7, 1996) (admitting MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT into evidence), and
Montiel v. City of Los Angeles, 2 F.3d 335, 341-42 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding lower court
should have presumed CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT trustworthy and put burden of
establishing untrustworthiness on city), with Williams v. City of New York, CV-94-6234, at
78-85 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1996) (barring plaintiff's admission of MOLLEN COMMISSION
REPORT findings on the "code of silence" for purposes of questioning the credibility of
police officer witnesses), and Bryant v. New York City, CV-92-0960, slip op. at 9-10
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1994) (excluding MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT in case alleging
excessive force by a police officer). Though the admissibility of commission reports is
beyond the scope of this Article, Chin & Wells, supra note 241, at 284-85, discuss the
practical concerns of using such reports to demonstrate the existence and effect of the code
of silence as evidence against individual police officers. See also Carol Ann Humiston,
Paved With Good Intentions: The Use of Internal Evaluations of Law Enforcement Agencies
in Civil Lawsuits, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 364, 368 (1994) (concluding that the issue of the
admissibility into evidence of a commission's findings "is a question which must soon be
definitely resolved").
294
See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 211, at 168.
295 Id.
296
See id. at 169 (explaining that officer's explanation for lying to investigators was the
"non-written rule that you do not roll over, tell on your partner, your companion").
291
See id. at ix-xii, I 65-70 (stating that frequently "bad cops" were not held accountable
for their actions).
298
See id. at 169. The Report concluded that high-ranking officials knew or should have
known of the "officer code of silence" prior to the release of the report based largely on the
testimony of Department officials, including Los Angeles Police Commissioner Darryl
Gates, who testified that the existence of a police code of silence discouraged officers from
reporting instances of misconduct by fellow officers, and created an environment in which
officers who defied the expectation of silence suffered recrimination. See id.
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describes the code of silence as "[p]erhaps the greatest single barrier to the
effective investigation and adjudication of complaints."299
The Mollen Commission reached similar conclusions in its important 1994
report, a study aimed at investigating police corruption in New York City. 300
The Commission found a pattern of illegal behavior that had extended to many
precincts targeted both line officers and high police officials, and had lasted for
several decades. 301 The report found that the deeply ingrained "code of
silence" was essential to the pattern of corruption exposed by the Commission,
since the code "encourage[d] corruption" and "thwart[ed] efforts to control
corruption," by forcing the honest officers to protect corrupt colleagues from
detection. 302 The Commission also noted that New York Police Department
officers stringently, albeit informally, enforce the code:
Officers who report misconduct are ostracized and harassed; become
targets of complaints and even physical threats; and are made to fear that
they will be left alone on the streets in a time of crisis. This draconian
enforcement of the code of silence fuels corruption because it makes
corrupt cops feel protected and invulnerable. 303
Based on the specific instances it described in the Report, the Commission
concluded that enforcement of the code of silence was pervasive: it extended to
virtually all precincts and targeted both line officers and higher police
officials. 304 The Report further noted that since Department officials were
aware of the code's persistence, its continuation reflected long-standing, albeit
unofficial, ratification by the senior Department officials, including the Police
Commissioners. 305
299

Id. at 168.
See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 210, at vii-viii (finding "police
committed perjury in the course of their work, 'as a means to conceal other underlying acts
of corruption"').
301 See id. at 51 (noting that lack of fear on the part of dishonest officers, documented
over 20 years ago during the Knapp Commission, still persisted in the New York Police
Department in 1994, and that officers of every rank verified the existence of the code of
silence).
302 Id.
300

303

Id. at 53.
See id. at 51 (finding that officers of every rank verified the existence of a code of
silence in the department).
305 See id. at 58 (warning that department's failure to protect officers who report
corruption "communicates a powerful message: that the [d]epartment is not really interested
in enlisting the police in the fight against corruption). During testimony before the Mollen
Commission, the Police Commissioner at the time, Raymond Kelly, along with other highranking Department officials, conceded that the so-called code of silence endured within the
police department. See id. at 51-53. The Commission described the problem as follows:
The Department also has done little to attempt to penetrate the wall of silence, although
it is one of the major barriers to identifying and uncovering corruption. The
Department never aggressively solicited information from its members. It did not
304
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Similarly, in Boston, following a high-profile police scandal, then-Mayor
Raymond Flynn appointed a commission to review the Boston Police
Department's treatment of police brutality issues. 306 The ensuing St. Clair
Report, 307 released in the spring of 1993, noted that a number of problems
stemmed from a rampant code of silence. For example, the Commission found
that experienced investigators refused to volunteer for the Internal Affairs
Division "because they fear[ed] retribution once they [got back on the
street]." 308 In fact, the Report found that the Internal Affairs Division ("IAD"),
which is generally responsible for investigating allegations against police
officers and the department, was chronically understaffed because officers did
not want to be involved in investigations of their colleagues, or because they
feared the consequences of an adverse determination against a colleague. 309
Similarly, officers shunned temporary promotions to "acting sergeant" despite
higher pay and prestige, because they did not want to have to discipline a
fellow officer when they "might be back riding with that officer sometime in
the future." 310
Likewise, in a recent study of fourteen U.S. cities, the Human Rights Watch
found that the code of silence affected all levels of the police departments they
studied, from "street officers who witness abuses and fail to report them," to
"supervisors and ultimately police commissioners and chiefs."311 The report

reward courageous officers who came forward with valuable information; or penalize
those who failed to report evidence of widespread or serious corruption about which
they had personal knowledge. And it did nothing to try to educate its members as to
why reporting and not tolerating corruption is essential to the Department and to them.
Indeed, we found that the first time the Department's top managers made an
affirmative effort to solicit any information on corruption from its members was when
this Commission attempted to do so.
Id. at 107.
306 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, supra note 12, at 139-40 (describing the
excessive force used during Boston's Charles Stuart case as one impetus for appointment of
the Commission). In the 1989 Stuart murder case, Charles Stuart, a white man, allegedly
murdered his pregnant wife and then diverted suspicion from himself by claiming that the
assailant had been a black man. Stuart's description of a black assailant led to round-ups
and harassment of African-American men, which produced outrage in the African-American
community, especially once it seemed clear that Stuart was, in fact, the killer. See Kevin
Cullen & Mike Barnicle, Probers Suspect Stuart Killed Wife to Collect Insurance, Start
Restaurant, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 1990, at I (reporting that recovered murder weapon
matched description of gun missing from store where Stuart was a manager); Kevin Cullen
et al., Stuart Dies in Jump Off Tobin Bridge After Police Are Told He Killed His Wife,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1990, at I (stating that Stuart's brother admitted to helping Stuart
dispose of the .38 caliber revolver used in the shooting).
307
30s
309

310
31 I

See ST. CLAIR REPORT, supra note 258.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 59.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, supra note 12, at 71. The report also noted that the
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went on to note that even if a complaint of excessive force was actually
sustained, the injured party had no guarantee that the department would levy an
appropriate punishment on the offending officer. 312 The study concluded that
"the code of silence all but assures impunity for officers who commit human
rights violations," and that its perpetuation would allow "officers who commit
abuses [to] flourish." 31 3
Other authorities also recognize the difficulties facing a plaintiff proceeding
with a code of silence case. For example, in one case, former United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr.,
recognized the problem of virtual immunity for officers when he stated during
a police corruption trial, that "there is a custom that has developed within the
Philadelphia Police Department that Philadelphia police officers will acquiesce
in the illegal and improper conduct of their fellow officers, and that when
called to tell the truth .. . the Philadelphia police officer will remain silent." 314
Further, United States Attorney Dennis personally requested that the judge not
impose a prison term on the corrupt police officer who broke the code of
silence as he did not want to discourage other officers from coming forward. 315
In certain instances, judges have also noted the existence of a police code of
silence that constrains members of the police department from reporting on
their colleagues. Judge Grady's comments during the case of United States v.
Ambrose316 illustrate this point: during sentencing, the judge declared that "it is
a fact ... that there is a code of silence [in the Chicago Police Department] ,

code of silence had a particularly strong effect in police departments like New Orleans and
Philadelphia, "where police abuse and corruption have been visibly rampant." Id.
312 See id. at 72 (citing the reluctance of ranking officers to discipline fellow officers, and
the imposition of arbitrary statutes of limitation following indecisive action by the
department, as two explanations for the infrequency of officer punishment).
313 Id. at 71. Amnesty International's study of the New York City Police Department
also found that in many cases "international standards as well as United States Jaw and
police guidelines prohibiting torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
appear[ed] to have been violated with impunity" and that prosecutions for excessive force
were very low, due, in part, to the code of silence. AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, supra note 212,
at 2; cf. Seth Mydans, Era in Los Angeles Ends as Chief Quits, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1992,
at 6L (reporting that one of new Police Chief Willie I. Williams' responses to the release of
the report criticizing the Los Angeles Police Department was that "he hoped to start a
community-based approach to policing [that would end] what he called the 'paramilitary
mentality' of the department under [newly-resigned] Chief [Daryl F.] Gates").
314 Tim Weiner, Ex-Officer Who Broke the Code of Silence Given Probation, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 13, 1985, at Al.
315 See id. (reporting that the judge stated that though officer "had committed 'terrible
offenses under the law' . .. he was the first indicted officer to cooperate fully with the
investigation, and that the government's plea for 'extraordinary leniency' was persuasive").
316 740 F.2d 505, 505 (7th Cir. 1984), abrogated by United States v. Pino-Perez, 870
F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1989).
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and that most policemen observe it."317
Clearly, the code of silence makes it difficult for plaintiffs suing under §
1983 to gather evidence that directly relates to police misconduct in their
particular case.318 Thus, plaintiffs seeking to establish the existence of a
"widespread practice," (a required element of a custom claim), may point to
previous § 1983 or other civil rights suits, and the evidence used therein, for
proof of prior occurrences of police misconduct. 319 For example, Paula WhiteRuiz, in her suit against her police department supervisors and the City of New
York, used testimony from current and former police officers, police academy
personnel, internal affairs supervisors, and the Mallen Commission Report to
establish the persistence of the code of silence among New York Police
Department officers. 320 Thus, the admissibility of such diverse sources of
317

See id. at 521 , quoted in Myatt v. City of Chicago, No. 90-C-03991, 1991 WL 94036,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1991) (finding plaintiff could cite Judge Grady's comments to
support allegations of a code of silence); cf. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
211 , at 170 (citing a judge's statement during prosecution of three Los Angeles Police
Department officers that "many of the [police officer witnesses were] clearly lying" and that
he could not "think of a case in [his] life .. . where [he had] seen more false testimony").
3 18 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, supra note 12, at 69 (finding that officers will
give false testimony in court, or "testilie," in order to cover up police misconduct).
3 19 See Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 973 (3d Cir. 1996) (allowing plaintiff to
introduce civilian complaints, similar in nature to his own, which had been "transmitted
through the police department chain of command to the Chief of Police" who "[t]hus . . .
had knowledge of the complaints," to establish that the Chief "knew, or should have known"
of the defendant officer's customary violence when making arrests); Kopf v. Wing, 942
F.2d 265, 269 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing grant of summary judgment because appellant had
cited numerous instances of excessive police force such that "a fair-mindedjury could find
that the county has a custom or practice of letting incidents of excessive force go
unpunished"); Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 852-53 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding
plaintiffs introduction of a former station commander's testimony, that it was customary
police conduct to charge someone with public intoxication "for reasons other than
intoxication," and that during his command he allowed this custom to continue, was
sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have concluded that a long-standing custom
existed); Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
trial judge erred in refusing to allow plaintiffs to use evidence of similar instances of
excessive police force to establish that excessive force was a widespread custom).
320 See White-Ruiz v. City of New York, 983 F. Supp. 365, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("From
the outset of plaintiff s tenure at the precinct, she was made to feel like an outcast, shunned
by many of her fellow officers and plainly not supported by her precinct commander. In
microcosm, this series of events reproduces the pattern identified six years later by the
Mollen Commission."); see also Beck, 89 F.3d at 973 (holding that the district court erred in
granting defendants ' motion for summary judgment, as plaintiff had presented a series of
written complaints describing defendant officer's use of excessive force on prior occasions,
along with the testimony of witnesses to some of the incidents, from which a reasonable jury
could infer that a custom existed within the department); Borcianaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d
1151, 1156 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that plaintiff had proven a municipal "custom" existed
based on current police sergeant's testimony that the department "had a longstanding,
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evidence may ease the burden a custom plaintiff has in proving that a
constitutional violation stemmed from a code of silence.
VI. THE POTENTIAL REMEDIAL EFFECTS OF "CUSTOM" CLAIMS

It is also important to consider the potential remedial effects that a "custom"
claim can have, beyond mere compensation to an injured plaintiff.
Specifically, a "custom" claim has the potential to effect reform and promote
the development of deterrent procedures within problematic municipal
institutions. 32 1 In the private tort law context, commentators have argued that
institutional change is induced not only by the threat of monetary penalties, but
for other reasons, including a defendant's desire to avoid adverse publicity, the
cost and burden of litigation, and the sting of a determination of liability. 322
Such behavior-modifying factors should have an even stronger effect in the
public law sphere, where municipal liability claims based on unconstitutional
customs can implicate high profile social issues, such as police brutality,
corruption, or cover-ups. I do not mean to suggest that high profile custom
claims are more effective tools for reform or deterrence than other claims.
Successful claims for municipal liability based on any of the three "policy"
models discussed in Part III may be just as likely (or unlikely) to reform and
deter offending local agencies. And indeed, it may be quite difficult for
plaintiffs with § 1983 claims based on either "custom" or "policy" to obtain
any sort of equitable relief. 323

widespread" practice of breaking down doors without a warrant and that he, himself, had
been present at "20 or 30" or "50, 60" door breakdowns during his 24 years as a police
officer).
32 1
As Professor Meltzer has noted in an analogous context, "the deterrent remedy is a
distinctive creature, inspired (and perhaps required) by the Constitution, and, more
specifically, by an interpretation that seeks to adapt the Constitution's demands to the
distinctive problems of preventing conduct by public officials in an era of large government
institutions." In other words, the enforced constitutional behavior is a major goal of the
federal civil rights laws. Meltzer, supra note 260, at 278.
322
See Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity-An Alternative Punitive Damage Sanction,
45 DEPAUL L. REv. 341, 364-65 (1996) (arguing that publication of monetary punitive
damage awards will further punitive goals); Lant B. Davis et al., Suing the Police in Federal
Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 809 n.1 54 (1979) (stating that police misconduct suits may also
have a deterrent effect on an officer due to potential "emotional stress, adverse publicity,
and detrimental effects on the officer's career"); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the
"Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 10-11 (1974) (finding remedial goals of§
1983 different from the goals of tort law, as § 1983 goals include deterrence along with
compensation).
323 The greatest obstacle facing § 1983 litigants who seek injunctive relief is the concept
of "equitable standing," articulated most recently by the Supreme Court in City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). In Lyons, the Supreme Court found that respondent,
a black motorist who had been injured by defendant officer's use of a chokehold, lacked
standing to seek injunctive relief because he failed to "make a reasonable showing that he
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Rather, I only suggest that claims based on "custom" may have a somewhat
different effect (in terms of the public perception, rather than in terms of the
actual legal remedy), than "policy"-based claims. Once again, White-Ruiz v.
City of New York324 provides a useful template. In White-Ruiz, the district
court's written decision stated that a "blue wall of silence" existed within the
New York City Police Department which "constitute[d] a custom or usage of
the Department and that the actions allegedly directed against plaintiff by her
fellow officers were a manifestation of that practice."325 Consequently, the
court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, as a jury question
existed regarding whether "such conduct constitute[d] a custom or usage so
widespread as to imply the constructive acquiescence of policymaking officials
and the municipalities."326 The court further concluded that based on findings
from the Mollen Commission Report, there was a triable issue of fact as to
whether the "Police Commissioners and their policy-making subordinates not
only shut their eyes to [the] pattern of corruption and retaliation, but actually
encouraged the non-disclosure of corrupt conduct by officers."327 The court's
criticism sent shock waves throughout the Police Department, and local and
national organizations reported its findings in the news. 328 In response to the
[would] again be subjected to the alleged illegality." Id. at 109. In order to establish an
actual threat of future injury, respondent "would have had not only to allege that he would
have another encounter with the police but also to make the incredible assertion either (I)
that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to
have an encounter, or (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such
manner." Id. at 106. Thus, after Lyons, the equitable standing test requires a plaintiff to
show that at the time the request for equitable relief is considered, he is virtually certain to
fall victim to that illegal practice in the future. Clearly, in most circumstances, this will be
an impossible showing. For criticism of the Lyons test, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on The Jurisprudence of Lyons,
59 N.Y.U.L. REv. I, 7 (1984) (stating that the Lyons decision undennined the federal
government's ability to effectively redress injury to federally protected rights); LAURENCE
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 99-117 (1985); Linda E. Fisher, Caging Lyons: The
Availability of Injunctive Relief in Section /983 Actions, 18 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. I 085, 1118
(1987) (concluding that "Lyons unnecessarily limits the remedies available to those
subjected to unconstitutional conduct"). For cases involving denied pleas for equitable
intervention preceding Lyons, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976) (finding
plaintiff's claim of future, potential injury was too "attenuated" to warrant injunctive relief);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (ruling that "past exposure to illegal conduct
did not in itself show a present case or controversy [warranting] injunctive relief').
324 No. 93-CIV-7233, 1996 WL 603983, *I (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1996).
325
Id. at *8.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328
See English, supra note 230, at A29 (detailing the retribution Officer White-Ruiz
faced from other officers after "ratting" on her partner's corrupt activities); NYPD Blues,
Eye to Eye, supra note 240, and accompanying text (interview with White-Ruiz,
Commissioner Bratton and others regarding the "blue wall of silence").
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court's findings, then-Commissioner William Bratton issued public statements
deriding police officers who failed to disclose corruption, or who retaliated
against officers who did come forward. 329 Commissioner Bratton also stated
that "[t]he dent that we can make is in reducing the tolerance [of corruption].
It's a different day and age now-that this corruption is dangerous. It can cost
citizens' lives and it can cost [police officers'] lives. And when [police
officers] come to understand that, I think they'll be much more willing to get in
the game." 330 To combat the persistence of the "blue wall of silence," a special
inquiry panel recommended loyalty oaths for new police officers, lie detector
tests for officers under suspicion, and rewards to whistle-blowers on the force.
In short, the court's holding in White-Ruiz that the City was liable for injuries
to an officer stemming from the New York Police Department's
unconstitutional custom, the "police code of silence," was a singularly
effective method of calling a serious constitutional problem to the attention of
city policymakers, police officers, and the public at large.
To be sure, White-Ruiz is just one case, and it would be unrealistic to expect
a wholesale renovation of police department culture in its wake. I do believe
that future repeated and focused attacks upon the code of silence as an
unconstitutional "custom" tan together engender meaningful institutional
change, even in a culture as recalcitrant as that of the New York Police
Department. A key term here is "focused": to induce the reformation of
"customs" that abridge constitutional rights, it is necessary that municipal
liability be grounded squarely upon the maintenance of those particular
customs.331 However, it is not the general imposition of municipal liability
alone that spurs internal corrective action. 332 Rather, it is the additional
affirmative value that stems from a judicial pronouncement that a particular
offensive custom is responsible for particular injuries. The agents of
institutional change lie in the attendant publicity, the fear that a floodgate may
have been opened, and the knowledge that the maintenance of this particular
329
330

See NYPD Blues, Eye to Eye, supra note 240.
Id.

33 1 See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo. , 445 U.S. 622 (1980). The Owen Court
stated that
[Section] 1983 was intended not only to provide compensation to the victims of past
abuses, but to serve as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as well.
(citations omitted) The knowledge that a municipality will be liable for all of its
injurious conduct, whether committed in good faith or not, should create an incentive
for officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions to
err on the side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights. Furthermore, the threat that
damages might be levied against the city may encourage those in a policymaking
position to institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of
unintentional infringements on constitutional rights.
Id. at 651.
332 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 260, at 54-58; Davi s et al., supra note 322, at 809 n.154
(noting that the verdict can deter the particular defendant-officer due to adverse publicity
and the effect on the officer's career).
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custom has caused, and is likely to further cause, incursions on the public fisc.
Where the offensive custom is judicially identified with such particularity,
there is little room for an institution to assert a "bad apple theory" to avoid
responsibility for the wrongdoing, and to deflect blame onto the proverbial
"bad apple" officer. 333 In conclusion, I believe that focusing constitutional tort
litigation activity upon clearly delineated, pernicious "customs" holds promise,
not only for compensating the individuals directly injured by these illegal
practices, but also for effecting institutional change within contemporary urban
law enforcement agencies.
CONCLUSION

In this article, I have argued that § 1983' s "custom" language, largely
forgotten by lawyers, courts and commentators, holds the promise of
reinvigorating modem civil rights litigation. In making this argument, I have
focused on the police code of silence, which I contend is so pervasive - and
which causes constitutional injuries in so many different ways - that claims
directly challenging the code as an unconstitutional custom have the potential
to reconfigure the entire landscape of § 1983 jurisprudence. Of course, other
pernicious municipal customs are equally susceptible to attack on the theory I
have advanced here, 334 including the widespread practice of "racial profiling,"
whereby rank-and-file officers make stops and searches based upon race and
other demographics. 335 While the 42nd Congress might not have foreseen

333

Based on this blame-shifting, I am doubtful that the doctrine of respondeat superior
liability would be effective to induce institutional behavior modification. The imposition of
, strict municipal liability by operation of a respondeat regime----or for that matter, pursuant to
an indemnification statute-<loes nothing to locate guilt within the internal culture of the
institution, and, indeed, invites the institution to deflect responsibility and eschew corrective
reform measures.
334
For example, the New York Times recently reported on "[t]he hallowed police rite
known as the 'perp walk,"' a term that refers to the ritual of "walking" a recently arrested
"perpetrator" in front of reporters and photographers in order to "showcas[e] the police
department's crime-fighting skills, and satiat[e] the media's demand for a glimpse of the
suspect." Benjamin Weiser, Judge Condemns Policy of Parading Suspects Past Cameras,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at Bl. The media has recently focused on the "perp walk" (an
age-old custom dating back to Theodore Roosevelt's tenure as New York City Police
Commissioner) after a burglary suspect subjected to the "perp walk" filed a § 1983 suit
claiming that this New York City Police Department custom violated his constitutional
rights. See id. (noting that Judge Allen G. Schwartz announced that the suspect could
proceed with his lawsuit against the City). See also Blaine Harden, Parading of Suspects is
Evolving Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at Bl (reporting that police had temporarily
halted "perp walk" tradition pending appeal of judge's ruling that "perp walk" of plaintiff
was an unconstitutional violation of his right to privacy).
335
See Nicholas Wishart, Statistics Support Racial Profiling on Turnpike Lawyers Say,
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 12, 1995, at SOI (citing attorneys' data findings that between
January, 1988 and April, 1991, African-American and Latino motorists in New Jersey were
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these particular customs, the § 1983 framers were acutely aware that unwritten
codes of conduct, adhered to by rank and file officers, were uniquely potent
forces in undermining rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. By
rediscovering the meaning and intent of "custom" under§ 1983, we should be
able to develop a theory of civil rights liability that meaningfully addresses
common constitutional deprivations caused by police in urban America today.

"500 percent more likely to get stopped than white motorists"). A civil rights advocacy
group recently filed a § 1983 suit against the New York City Police Department alleging
that the elite Street Crimes Unit had engaged in unconstitutional stops and searches on the
basis of race. See Benjamin Weiser, Lawsuit Seeks to Curb Street Crimes Unit, Alleging
Racially Biased Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1999, at B3. But cf. Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 817-18 (1996) (finding that probable cause justified stop and searches of two
black defendants). Biased or selective prosecutions may also, under certain circumstances,
fall within the § 1983 "custom" model of municipal liability. See, e.g., Butler v. Cooper,
554 F.2d 645, 648-49 (4th Cir. 1977) (sustaining summary judgment against pro se
defendant, even assuming the truth of defendant's contention that between 84% and 98% of
all persons arrested for violations of specific liquor laws in Portsmouth, Virginia were
African-American).

